Neorealism And The Relationship Of Iran And The United States

Introduction

Relations between Iran and the United States are shaped by an enduring combination of power asymmetry, regional rivalry, sanctions, historical distrust, domestic politics, and the nuclear issue. Neorealism provides a useful framework because it begins from an international system without a central authority capable of guaranteeing state security. In that environment, governments monitor relative capabilities, build deterrence, form partnerships, and interpret uncertainty as a potential threat. The Iran–U.S. relationship demonstrates a classic security dilemma. Iran describes missiles, regional partnerships, and strategic depth as ways to deter stronger adversaries, while the United States and several regional partners view those same capabilities as sources of coercion and instability. Conversely, U.S. military presence, sanctions, and alliances are presented in Washington as tools of deterrence and pressure but can be interpreted in Tehran as evidence of encirclement or regime threat. Neorealism explains this reciprocal insecurity well, although it cannot by itself account for ideology, revolutionary identity, historical memory, international law, or domestic political competition.

Power Asymmetry and Regional Balancing

The United States possesses substantially greater global military, financial, technological, and alliance capabilities than Iran, so Iran cannot balance American power symmetrically. Instead, Tehran has invested in missiles, drones, maritime capabilities, cyber tools, and relationships with armed groups and political movements across the region. These instruments can increase the cost of military pressure and create leverage in neighboring conflicts. The United States, meanwhile, supports regional partners through arms sales, bases, intelligence cooperation, naval deployments, and missile defense. From a neorealist perspective, neither side needs to assume that the other has permanently aggressive intentions for competition to persist. Capabilities can be redirected, governments change, and commitments may not be credible over long periods. Israel, Gulf states, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and shipping routes in the Gulf further complicate the bilateral relationship because local conflicts become connected with broader balancing behavior. Regional actors also pursue their own interests rather than functioning simply as extensions of Washington or Tehran, which limits any explanation that reduces the system to two perfectly coordinated camps.

The Nuclear Question and Verification

The nuclear issue illustrates the difference between technical capability and political intention. Uranium enrichment has legitimate civilian uses, but higher enrichment levels and accumulated material can shorten the time needed to produce weapons-usable material if a government decides to pursue a weapon. Verification is therefore central to international confidence. Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency remains in force, while the Additional Protocol signed in 2003 has not entered into force (IAEA, 2026). The verification environment became more difficult after attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025 and Iran’s subsequent law suspending cooperation; an IAEA report from September 2025 stated that the Agency had lost access to most safeguarded facilities after June 13, 2025, apart from Bushehr, and was monitoring developments through other means where possible (IAEA, 2025). These circumstances intensify uncertainty, which neorealism treats as strategically important. Reduced verification can increase threat perceptions even when each side claims its actions are defensive.

Sanctions and Economic Statecraft

Sanctions demonstrate how economic power can be converted into strategic leverage. The United States has long used restrictions on finance, energy, shipping, trade, and designated individuals or entities to pressure Iran over nuclear, missile, regional, and terrorism-related concerns. This policy remained active in September 2026. U.S. Treasury actions that month included sanctions against networks it said supported Iran-aligned armed groups and against VTB Bank for alleged involvement in Iranian sanctions evasion, while OFAC also tightened licensing policy in some Iran-related cases (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2026). These measures show the continuing importance of access to international banking and dollar-based transactions. Yet sanctions do not automatically produce political concessions. Target governments can develop evasion networks, alternative trade relationships, domestic substitution, and stronger ties with other powers. Economic costs may also fall heavily on ordinary households through inflation, reduced investment, and financial isolation. Neorealism predicts that states will resist dependence when economic connections can later be weaponized, making sanctions both a source of leverage and an incentive to build alternative channels.

Domestic Politics, History, and the Limits of Neorealism

Structural realism explains persistent rivalry across changes in leadership, but domestic and historical factors affect how states respond to the same external pressures. Iranian political memory includes the 1953 overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, U.S. support for the shah, and American policy during the Iran–Iraq War. American political memory includes the 1979 embassy seizure, hostage crisis, attacks attributed to Iran-supported groups, and repeated confrontations involving U.S. personnel and regional partners. These experiences shape threat perception and political rhetoric in ways that cannot be derived from the international distribution of power alone. Domestic institutions also matter. U.S. presidents operate within Congress, courts, elections, bureaucracies, alliances, and public opinion, while Iranian policy is shaped by the supreme leader, elected institutions, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, clerical bodies, and factional competition. A purely neorealist account therefore risks treating both states as unitary actors. Constructivism, liberal institutionalism, and domestic-politics approaches help explain why similar structural incentives can produce different strategies at different times.

Risk Reduction and the Logic of Limited Cooperation

Neorealism does not imply that cooperation is impossible. Even adversaries may negotiate when the cost of uncertainty becomes high and agreements contain credible verification or reciprocal incentives. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action demonstrated that nuclear limits, inspections, and sanctions relief could be linked temporarily, while its later breakdown illustrated the problem of durable commitment when governments doubt whether the other side will maintain the bargain. Future risk reduction does not necessarily require one comprehensive settlement. Narrow arrangements concerning nuclear monitoring, maritime incidents, prisoners, humanitarian transactions, crisis communication, or particular regional issues can reduce the probability of accidental escalation. Such agreements work best when steps are observable and reciprocal rather than dependent on trust alone. Communication channels are particularly important during crises because ambiguous attacks, proxy activity, cyber incidents, and military deployments can create pressure for rapid retaliation. A neorealist state concerned primarily with survival has a reason to avoid unnecessary miscalculation even while preserving deterrence and bargaining leverage.

Conclusion

Neorealism explains important features of the Iran–United States relationship by emphasizing anarchy, unequal capabilities, regional balancing, deterrence, relative gains, and the security dilemma. It helps explain why Iran invests in asymmetric capabilities and why the United States and its partners remain concerned about capabilities that could shift the regional balance. It does not establish that either side’s preferred policy is objectively necessary or that proliferation, sanctions, or military pressure will produce stable outcomes. Historical memory, ideology, domestic institutions, legal obligations, and international verification also shape the relationship. Current sanctions activity in 2026 and the continuing safeguards framework show that coercion and institutional monitoring remain central elements of the rivalry (IAEA, 2026; U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2026). The most useful theoretical conclusion is therefore analytical rather than prescriptive: security measures can generate countermeasures when adversaries cannot credibly distinguish defensive intentions from future offensive possibilities. Understanding that dynamic helps explain why Iranian nuclear policy and U.S. pressure remain interconnected even when leaders change.

References

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