Academic Master


The Role Of The Public Administration In Fighting Corruption

Question 1

Corruption in any management system includes two essentially different components: corruption in the apparatus – the classical problem of ensuring the reliability of all parts of the management system; with respect to corporate governance, the main recipes have long been known; not ideal, but practical solutions have been found, and the problem is only the desire to implement them and corruption “at the very top” of the management system, as a rule, with all its might being silenced and dissolved in the first problem. It is the key problem of the development of modern American society, and this is the subject of this section. The section does not touch upon the problems of corruption development in non-state (in particular, corporate) management systems, as well as at the grassroots level of the state apparatus, since these types of corruption are limited to a low level for society and do not pose an immediate threat to its existence (Stapenhurst & Langseth, 1997).

The authors proceed from the assumption that corruption in the administrative management system, firmly fenced off from life by ideology and decisions, is often the only way to convey to the decision-makers even a whiff of real economic interests (as was often the case with a centralized economy).

The more reasonable the management system, the more market and democratic mechanisms are involved in it, and the more destructive the role of bribes. After all, management is all the more effective the more fully it takes into account the interests of social forces affected by the problem being solved. And the whole science of management is engaged in building the most harmonious and harmonious way of combining these interests.

The bribe breaks the balanced mechanism of accounting for interests and provides an arbitrary-random, and therefore, as a rule, unreasonable choice of decisions – based on the principle of “who first came in”.

This is the fundamental difference between corruption, both from civilized lobbying, persuading officials within the framework of a well-established and generally rational decision-making mechanism, and from the art of public relations supplanting the lobbying, no longer convincing officials, but public opinion that exerts a growing influence on the latter in a democratic society.

Therefore, if lobbying is an institution of representative, parliamentary democracy, and public relations is an element of universal democracy, a bribe is a fundamentally anti-democratic tool. I not only do not contribute to the balancing of interests but, on the contrary, objectively lead to the destruction of the mechanisms of this balancing and the maximum disorganization of the management process (Ionescu, 2015).

Let’s repeat: this destruction and disorganization is by no means always evil. But America broke up with a management system for which they were not evil more than ten years ago.

Correspondingly, corruption has been an absolute evil for more than ten years, not only from a moral point of view but also from a practical, managerial point of view.

An Outline of Anti-Corruption Efforts in Post-Soviet America

The first attempts to limit corruption were declarative in nature and were primarily instruments of the current political struggle. A vivid illustration of measures of this kind was the o, order of the eonChairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, Boris Yeltsin, on July 17, 1990, which provided for the immediate abolition of all Privileges (Stapenhurst & Langseth, 1997).

The problem of corruption was explicitly raised already in 1992 when the Presidential Decree “On Combating Corruption in the Public Service System” was issued. However, it was not taken seriously, and its norms on the need for officials to submit declarations on income and property began to be realized only five years after the issuance of an additional Decree in 1997. The norm prohibiting officials from engaging in business activities has, in fact, not been fulfilled so far. The Federal Law “On the Principles of Civil Service in the American Federation”, which appeared somewhat later, provided some restrictive anti-corruption measures.

The new Criminal Code, which was enacted in early 1997, contains a number of articles that allow fighting corruption. At the same time, many of the actions of a clearly corrupt nature in America (for example, the participation of officials in commercial activities for the extraction of personal profits, the provision of privileges to commercial structures for the purpose of extracting personal profits, etc.) have not been reflected in it (Ionescu, 2015).

Since 1997, some attempts have been made to eradicate the conditions that give rise to corruption, for example, the introduction of openness and competitiveness in the procedure for the distribution of orders for public procurement. However, these efforts did not turn into a system and, in fact, began to fade.

In early 1997, the President of the American Federation was instructed to develop a State-building program designed to modernize the management system in the country, which remained practically unchanged from the Stalin era. However, the management apparatus has developed in its place a much narrower and less concrete Concept of Administrative Reform, containing only general principles – and only in relation to the reform of the executive branch, the civil service and the anti-corruption program. Even such a document could be used as the first step towards improving the state, but he was buried in the bowels of the Presidential Administration. Corruption has been intensified by reforms, not only by the personal inclinations of reformers and their foreign operators but also by the extreme irrationality of their policies (Stapenhurst & Langseth, 1997).

The main reason for the rampant corruption in America is economic. The deliberately false slogan “the market will fix everything” has led to an aggressive, hostile entrepreneurial climate created by the absence of mechanisms for protecting property rights, overly stringent financial policies and only in the third place by an irrational tax system. Putting any businessman on the brink of survival, these factors push him into the “shadow sector”, which has the strongest disruptive impact on the whole society and primarily on the state (Ionescu, 2015).

The primary accumulation of capital was due to the division of state property, i.e., the decision of state employees appointed (and still appointed) millionaires. This process could not be disinterested and became a powerful stimulant of corruption.

Liberalization of foreign economic activity without taking into account the need to maintain the competitiveness of the national economy has transformed corruption into one of the spontaneously emerging mechanisms of informal protection of the domestic market, especially important in conditions when formalized, i.e. official mechanisms were eliminated by direct pressure from the world community. The essence of these spontaneously emerging mechanisms is to create a kind of “cultural barrier” in the form of a bad business climate in which a part of American business can still survive, and the foreign one dies.

World experience proves that with a sharp change in the fundamental conditions of life, the level of corruption almost always jumps. A significant role in the development of corruption processes was rendered by the “birthmarks of totalitarianism”, including social psychology and the general laws governing the transition to market relations, manifested primarily in the unpreparedness of society and the state to solve objectively the tasks facing them (Stapenhurst & Langseth, 1997).

The reformers showed a deep inclination to create various “politically-forming types of business”, which, among other things, provided solutions to the tasks of enriching groups that had seized power and creating a solid social and financial base for them in the form of those engaged in the corresponding types of business activity. Clearly, such “shadow security” was a direct stimulation of development and deepening of corruption.


Stapenhurst, F., & Langseth, P. (1997). The role of the public administration in fighting corruption. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 10(5), 311–330.

Ionescu, L. (2015). The Role of E-Government in Curbing the Corruption in Public Administration. Economics, Management & Financial Markets, 10(1), 48–53. Retrieved from



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