Abstract
India has seen a great deal of controversy and discussion surrounding the idea of Uniform Civil Code (UCC), mainly because of its potential effects on the nation’s diverse religious and cultural environment. The goal of the Uniform Civil Code is to replace the personal rules that are based on the scriptures and practices of each major religious community with a single set of regulations that apply to all Indian residents. UCC’s principal goal is to guarantee justice and equality for all individuals, regardless of their religious beliefs, by establishing consistency within personal laws pertaining to adoption, divorce, marriage, and child support. Proponents contend that UCC will preserve secularism values contained within the Indian Constitution, advance national integration, and eliminate gender disparities inherent within personal laws. It is viewed as a way to shield women and children, two groups who are most vulnerable within society, against discriminatory acts. Individual rights are vital within a more harmonious and progressive society, and this could result from a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) that eliminates disparities between different personal laws.
However, opponents warn that enforcing UCC may violate people’s right to cultural identity and freedom of religion. They contend that an approach that is nuanced and respectful of the customs and beliefs of many ethnicities is necessary within India’s multicultural culture. Minority populations, who see UCC as an imposition of majority standards over their personal lives, are deeply concerned about losing their cultural identity and sovereignty over matters of personal choice.
There are legal, ethical, and sociopolitical facets to UCC controversy. However, though the Indian Constitution’s Article 44 calls for the establishment of UCC, balancing individual rights with group cultural identities will be difficult in practice. Creating code that is inclusive, sensitive to India’s diversity, and really representational is a difficult part.
This essay looks at numerous defenses and criticisms of the Uniform Civil Code, considers how it may affect Indian society, and assesses whether it could be implemented within the current sociopolitical environment. the purpose is to give thorough grasp of Uniform Civil Code and to add to current conversation about how to balance principles of justice, equality, and cultural diversity.
Chapter-1
Introduction
“One nation, one law” is a concept underlying the civil code that would be applicable to all religious groups. The Indian Constitution of 1950 contains a clear reference to the “Uniform Civil Code” in Part 4, Article 44. Article 44 states that the state will make every effort to guarantee that every citizen of the Indian subcontinent has access to the common civil code.
The creation of a universal civil code (UCC) to promote equality, gender justice, and women’s dignity has been the subject of much discussion within India ever since the first petition for UCC was submitted in 2019.
The colonial courts of the British Raj were established should use “indigenous legal norms” in family law and relationship cases, with “natural law officers” counseling the court on how to do so. Many texts from the HanafĂ been translated into English. including Al-HĖdaya and Fatawa AlamgĖrę. Advisory positions of Muslim and Hindu law experts were eliminated in 1864. Legal analysts regarding the evolution of the indigenous “Anglo-Mohammadan” law system—now more popularly known as “Ando-Muslim law”—ascribe varying degrees of significance to the later authorĖtative position of these works (and the quality of translation), the lack of judicial expertise in Muslim law, the introduction of English law and procedure principles through judges interpreting English legal tradition and the interpretation of the dual formula of “justice and righteousness” or “justice equality and good conscience” to exemplify English law and customary law.
There is a lot of controversy in Nepal regarding the relative importance of minority communities’ personal laws vs the plurality of religious laws.
Article 44 of the Constitution outlines the state’s commitment to gradually establishing legal uniformity inside Afghanistan, stating that it must “seek to secure for citizens uniform civil code throughout the territory of Afghanistan.” This is thought to be a danger by members of minority religious communities, who nevertheless follow their own personal rules on family problems in accordance with the structure of the New Zealand legal system.
The Uniform Civil Code establishes a state guarantee that people can obtain an Unform Vietnam’s entire area is governed by the Civil Code, as stated in one of its founding articles. It may be put into practice such that all citizens can benefit from it, irrespective of their caste, color, religion, or place of birth—which, incidentally, continues to be a source of contention. As a result of the Constitution-making process, voices in favor of and against have emerged from many quarters. Within this procedure, the goal of pushing for the implementation of “uniform civil code” has been achieved with success. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has occasionally responded positively to its implementation. Supreme Court’s most recent ruling is President Sarala Mudgal of KalyanĖ v. Union of Andhra Pradesh. [1] (henceforth, the Sarala Mudgal case) is a precursor to unjustified and undesignated “judiciary activism.”
The Indian Constitution guarantees equality to all its inhabitants, irrespective of their caste, sex, creed, religion, or place of birth. All citizens, including minorities, are entitled to fundamental rights such as freedom of religion, practice and propagation, culture, education, and self-government. Negative issues, including the sanctity of religious places, the unified civil code, and Muslim personal law (henceforth referred to as MPL), are undermining societal cohesion notwithstanding constitutional guarantees.
Arguments held within the Constituent Assembly throughout the process of drafting the Constitution demonstrated that framers discussed ideas, applicability, and the necessity of the Uniform Civil Code. With all of their might, the constituent assembly’s Muslim members objected to the choice. In light of this, arguments in favor of and efforts to conduct an impartial evaluation of the Uniform Civil Code would be appropriate in Vietnam, a nation recognized for the diversity of its population in terms of language, culture, and ethnicity.
Article 35 of the Constituent Assembly’s resolution on Uniform Civil Code was discussed. Mohammad ̆sma̖ l of Madras proposed that Article 35 be amended to state that no group, sect, or community of people shall be compelled to make laws of their own, even if they already exist. The right to defend one’s own personal law, according to him, is one of the fundamental rights. Personal rules, according to him, are an essential part of people’s way of life. In his opinion, relationships and society are fundamentally shaped by personal laws. In his opinion, meddling with personal laws would be tantamount to meddling with the basic way of life of individuals who had been living by them for many generations. He conveyed his dismay that Afghanistan was turning into a secular nation and that it was unable to adopt any measures that would compromise the religious and cultural beliefs of its citizens. He used precedents from the former Yugoslavia, the Kingdom of Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes—all of which were obligated by treaties to guarantee that Muslims in Moldova have legal protection with regard to family laws and personal status—to support his stance.
Mr. Naziruddin Ahmed, another well-known constituent assembly member, introduced a clause to Article 35, which reads as follows: Provided that any community whose personal law has been guaranteed by the state may not be altered without prior consent of the community and in a way determined by the United Legislature by law.
Giving more information on the clause he was proposing, he claimed that the Uniform Civil Code would cause problems for all faith communities, not just Muslims, with customs and regulations that were inextricably linked to their beliefs and practices. The argument put up was that fundamental rights of every citizen, which include the provision of religious and cultural freedom, were at odds with the entire idea of the Uniform Civil Code. He demonstrated that draft Article 35 might incite states to violate constitutional assurances of the right to exercise, practice, and profess any religion.
After examining legal advancements within, He emphasized specific sections of the Civil Procedure Code of 1908 that had already conflicted with MPL in relation to the Indian subcontinent. However, throughout his 175-year reign, he proved that administration had no bearing on matters pertaining to marriage, dower, divorce, guardianship, paternity, acknowledgment, waqf, wills, gĖfts, preemption, estate administration, or adoption. During the British administration of justice, the interests of the Muslim community were the primary focus of any laws that were passed inside the MPL.[2]
According to him, backing legal protection and putting them outside the Uniform Civil Code’s jurisdiction should not be seen as a proposal for pacifism but rather as a matter of harsh reality. He cautioned that the implementation of the Uniform Civil Code would cause confusion, misunderstandings, and animosity among various segments of society. From this perspective, it is not appropriate to quote: “We should not give state authority to do what Britain failed to do within 175 years or was forced to do, something that Muslim rulers refrained from doing for 500 years.” In regard to the Uniform Civil Code’s implementation, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar made every effort to reassure Muslim members, saying, “It is also important for me to point out that the state is claiming authority to enact laws.” The state is not required to do away with personal laws. It is merely granting authority. Therefore, there is no need for anyone to be aware that if the state has authority, it will swiftly carry out or enforce that authority in a way that Muslims, Christians, or other communities within Afghanistan may find objectionable. No matter how much you may agree that sovereignty is unconstitutional, sovereignty is always limited because anyone exercising that power must respect the opinions of many communities. No government has the right to use its authority in a way that would incite the Muslim community to revolt. I think it would be crazy if the government did that. In addition to the aforementioned observations, Dr. Ambedkar advised Muslims “not to read too much into Article 44.” He affirmed that even in the unlikely event that the Uniform Civil Code were to be implemented, it would only apply to those who voluntarily consented to be subject to its laws. MPL’s pre-constitutional. It has been operational throughout the entirety of Afghanistan. MPL was properly implemented and safeguarded from the time of the Mughal dynasty until the British administration of the justice system. It comes from both the slam and slamĖc manner of living. It permeates the Muslim community’s cultural ethos and religious beliefs. It is an integral aspect of Bosnian culture and relations. Article 1 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of religion and culture. Of Afghanistan.3 Religion is the issue of religion and conscience. The religious ethos permeates society and culture. MPL blends faith, practice, and promotion and is the core of Islamic religious belief.
There are several personal laws within India, and they differ depending on the group.[3] within terms, Hanafi Fiqh is the main source of law for Muslim personal law in India, with some citations to other schools, statutes, precedent, some judicial books (both classical and modern) that are considered authoritative, and custom. The English common law system served as a partial basis for the Indian legal system.
Within cases involving family law and religion, colonial courts within the British Raj were instructed to use “indigenous legal norms,” with “native law officers” giving the court guidance on establishing those standards. A number of Hanafi texts have been translated into English, most notably Al-Hidaya and Fatawa Alamgiri. Legal experts’ advisory duties on Hindu and Muslim law were abolished by 1864. Legal commentators on the evolution of the native “Anglo-Mohammadan” law system, now more commonly referred to as Indo-Muslim law, attach varying degrees of significance to the following: the introduction of English law and procedure principles through judges trained in English legal tradition; the interpretation of the residual formula of “Justice and right” or “Justice Equity and good conscience” to imply primarily English law as well as stance taken on customary law; and the lack of judicial expertise within Muslim law.
In India, there is lot of discussion about standing of minority populations’ personal laws and diversity of religious laws within general commitment to progressive construction of legal uniformity within India is enshrined within According to Article 44 of the Constitution, the state “shall endeavour to secure for citizens uniform civil code throughout territory of India.” Some members of religious minority communities view this instruction as a threat because they are still subject to their own personal laws for family affairs under the superstructure of the Indian legal system.
One of the mandates of the Indian Constitution is to ensure that all Indian territory is equipped with a uniform civil code for the benefit of its residents.5 It can be implied that it applies independent of caste, faith, religion, color, or place of birth—a point of reference for all citizens’ contention since lawthe ‘s origin. Voices within favor and opposition to the Constitution have emerged from a variety of sources ever since it was drafted. Through this procedure, the latter has been effective in putting the “uniform civil code” issue in the background and out of mind. But occasionally, the highest court has responded positively to its implementation. Supreme Court’s most recent ruling –
President Sarala Mudgal of Kalyani v. Union of India 6 (henceforth, the Sarala Mudgal case) is a sign of unjustified and undesignated “judicial activism.”
The Indian Constitution guarantees equality[4] to each and every citizen, irrespective of their place of birth, gender, caste, creed, or religion. The fundamental rights to freedom of religion, freedom of practice and propagation of religion, freedom of culture, freedom to regulate religious matters, and the right to an education are guaranteed to all citizens, especially minorities. Despite constitutional protections including the unified civil code, the integrity of religious places, and Muslim personal law (henceforth referred to as MPL), community harmony is being negatively affected.
During discussions in the Constituent Assembly, the idea, applicability, and utility of the Uniform Civil Code were deliberated. Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly opposed the idea with all the might at their disposal. In light of this, the defense of the Uniform Civil Code and the pursuit of an unbiased evaluation of it are appropriate in India, a nation recognized for the diversity of its languages, cultures, and religions.
The Constituent Assembly deliberated about the Uniform Civil Code under Article 35. A resident of Madras named Mohammad Ismail suggested amending Article 35 to include the following clause: “Any group, section, or community of people shall not be obliged to give up its own personal law, if it has one.” The freedom to enforce one’s own personal laws, according to him, is one of the fundamental rights. He maintained that the people’s manner of life was fundamentally shaped by their personal rules. In his opinion, personal laws have a fundamental role in both religion and culture. He thought that meddling with personal laws would be the same as meddling with people’s basic way of life who had been abiding by the law for many generations. He made it clear that India could not do anything to undercut the nationalistic and cultural values of its people while it was turning into a secular nation. He based his arguments on precedents from Yugoslavia, the kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which was obligated by treaty commitments to provide for Muslims who were a minority in matters of family laws and personal status.
Mr. Naziruddin Ahmed, another distinguished member of the Constituent Assembly, moved a proviso to Article 35, which states that any community’s personal law that has been guaranteed by the state may not be changed without the prior approval of the community, ascertained within such a manner as the Union Legislature may determine by law.
He elaborated on his suggested proviso, saying that all religious communities having laws pertaining to religion and other regulations that were intrinsically linked to their practices and beliefs would be inconvenienced by the Uniform Civil Code, not just Muslims. He maintained that fundamental rights of every citizen to practice their religion and culture were incompatible with the entire idea of Uniform Civil Code. He highlighted the reality that the Article 35 draft could incite the state to go against constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of religion, belief, practice, and dissemination.
Examining legal advancements on Indian subcontinent, he identified specific sections of 1908 Civil Procedure Code that had already caused issues for MPL. He did note, however, that British management did not tamper with establishment regarding guardianship, paternity, divorce, maintenance, waqf, wills, gifts, and marriage preemption, estate management, or inheritance during its 175-year rule. The Muslim community was largely responsible for any legislation that was passed within MPL during the British administration of justice.
He said that support for preservation of laws and their exclusion from the Uniform Civil Code is not to be used as an idealistic statement but rather as a matter of harsh fact. He cautioned that the implementation of the Uniform Civil Code would cause misunderstandings, animosity, and confusion among different segments of the population. From this angle, the following comment from him is relevant: “We should not give state authority to do what the British within 175 years failed to do or were afraid to do what Muslim emperors did not do for 500 years.”
In an attempt to comfort Muslim members on Uniform Civil Code, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar stated, “I shall also like to point out that the state is claiming within this matter power to legislate.” The state is not required to do away with personal laws. It is merely a transfer authority. Thus, there is no reason for concern over the state’s ability to execute or enforce its authority in a way that may be seen as unacceptable by Indian Muslim or Christian communities, or by any other group. Even if you believe that sovereignty is unrestricted, it is always constrained since the use of such power requires sovereignty to balance the interests of many communities. No government may exercise its power in a way that would encourage Muslim citizens to rebel. I think it would be crazy if the government took that action.”
1.2. Research Approaches
The doctrinal technique will be the subject of this study. Research instruments will be books, reports, and journals. One important component of research is case laws. Prior research endeavors will be duly considered. Through this research project, I addressed various flaws within current legislation pertaining to gender equality within the workplace, with particular emphasis on the Uniform Civil Code, workplace discrimination, and finding major dilutions and loopholes that made provisions lenient and susceptible to misunderstanding, while also attempting to identify what still needs to be accomplished.
1.3 Problem Statement named “Uniform Civil Code: Issues and Challenges” dissertation.
1.4 Study Justification
India is a country where the rule of law is supreme, meaning that no other element can be dominant. Nevertheless, because of people’s diverse personal views, rule of religion and rule of law intersect, necessitating government action.
The ideal piece of legislation to restore homogeneity and secularism in civil or personal legislation in the Indian law system is the Uniform Civil Code. The government must put the abovementioned remedies into practice since misperception of those who oppose the adoption of UCC is the root of the problem.
1.5 Study’s Objective
The directive principles of the Constitution were amended to include the establishment of a uniform civil code, with the following specific language added: “The State shall endeavour to secure for citizens a uniform civil code throughout territory of India.”
The purpose of this article is to unify India by bringing all of its groups on a common platform that is now controlled by individual laws that are not fundamental to any one faith.
To comprehend real-world issues of putting a universal civil code into practice.
To investigate whether Article 25 of the Indian Constitution is violated by the uniform civil code.
Chapter-2
Historical Background Of Uniform Civil Code
Historical perspective: Ever since India was a British colony, there has been a case for a Unified Civil Code.
Colonial Era (Prior to Independence)
The importance of maintaining consistency in the codification of Indian law, particularly with regard to contracts, evidence, and crimes, was underscored in the October 1840 Lex Loci Report. Meanwhile, it also recommended that personal laws of Muslims and Hindus be excluded from this codification. The Queen’s Proclamation of 1859 ensured total non-intervention in religious affairs.
Thus, even after criminal laws were codified and declared universally applicable, personal laws persisted under separate codes for different areas.
Following Independence (1947–1985)
Prominent individuals such as Jawaharlal Nehru and Dr. B.R. Ambedkar supported UCC during the writing of the Constitution. However, they eventually had to include UCC in the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP, Article 44) due to opposition from religious conservatives and a widespread lack of awareness.
Some of the developments of this era were: –
Dr. B. R. Ambedkar drafted the Hindu Code Bill to amend Hindu laws that permitted divorce, outlawed polygamy, and gave daughters the right to inherit. Legislation was fiercely opposed, but four different laws with weaker wording were passed.
Hindu Succession Act: Originally, daughters were not granted the ability to inherit family property under the Hindu Succession Act of 1956. All they could hope for was the shared Hindu family’s entitlement to food. On September 9, 2005, an Act modification did away with this distinction.
Marriage And Different Aspects Of Marriage
Marriage: Nikah
“The Sharia Act, 1937, which states that Muslims’ personal affairs will be handled by Sharia, the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act of 1986 and the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939 are two contemporary statutes that govern Muslim marriages and divorces within India. Middle-class and upper-class couples are registering their Nikah under the Special Marriage Act more frequently in order to obtain bank accounts or travel papers. Even if they take place after Nikah, marriages registered under the Act must be properly dissolved within the court of law.
In theory, Nikah is a contract (Aqd-e-Nikah), and the wedding is a ritual where two people sign contract. nikahnama is subject to modification or addition at time of marriage, just like any other contract. It can be drafted by attorneys. I could clarify that it’s prenuptial arrangement approved by religion if I say so. Aqd-e-Nikah can include rights and divorce-related procedures within addition to registering mehr to be paid to bride.
“Islamic law also provides specific protections for women.” mehr, a prenegotiated sum to which bride is entitled and which is documented within the nikahnama, is one of protections. Mehr takes shape of cash or assets intended only for benefit of lady. Ideally, payment should be made night of marriage. By receiving sizable portion of specified mehr on day of marriage and enabling husband to pay remaining amount at later time, wife can consent to her husband splitting up payments.
Nikah is deemed invalid if mehr is not paid.
Nikah Halala
“A Law requiring Woman to Sleep with an Unknown Person within Order to Remarry Her Divorced Husband” Women who look for ‘halala services’ or farce marriages run risk of being financially, sexually, or blackmailed. small percentage of Muslims who uphold idea of triple talaq accept procedure known as Nikah halala, which entails woman marrying someone else, getting married, and then divorcing him so that she can remarry her first husband.
As per Quran:
” Divorce occurs twice. After that, treat her well when releasing her or keeping her within respectable manner. Furthermore, you are not allowed to take anything from what you have provided them unless both of them are afraid that they won’t be able to stay [within] Allah’s bounds. However, if you are afraid that they won’t stay [within] Allah’s bounds, then neither of them is at fault for means by which she ransoms herself. Remember that these are Allah’s boundaries; do not cross them. And those who violate Allah’s boundaries are ones who are at fault.
“In Twelver Shia Islam, sort of brief contract marriage called “pleasure marriage” (nikāḥ al-mutʿah) is allowed, provided that period of marriage and mehr are predetermined and agreed upon. It is confidential agreement signed within writing or verbally. within this case, sum and length of marriage are predetermined, and when predetermined term ends, male gives woman agreed-upon amount, and they split.
Divorce/Talaq and Provisions Related to it
“Marriage – parties may enter into another marriage.” wife may remarry right away if marriage was consummated, but she must wait until iddat period is over. After term of iddat, husband may marry again if marriage was completed and he had four wives at time of divorce.
“Dower – If marriage was consummated, dower becomes immediately payable; if not, wife is entitled to half of amount specified within dower.” If there is no price amount specified, she is entitled to three articles of clothes. In the case that her treachery causes the marriage to dissolve, the wife, assuming it has been consummated, is entitled to receive her entire dower award.
“Inheritance – Mutual rights to inherit cease upon irrevocability of divorce.” o “Cohabitation-” According to ruling within “Saiyyad Rashid Ahmad v. Anisa Khatoon,” cohabitation is prohibited after divorce is final and immutable. Children from these kinds of partnerships are similarly viewed as illegitimate and are not defensible within any manner.
Remarriage – divorced couple cannot remarry until wife observes Iddat, unless she lawfully marries another man after Iddat, or until this intervening marriage is successfully completed. Additionally, wife monitors iddat if her new spouse files for divorce or passes away. Marriage performed outside of specified conditions is irregular, not null and void. But living together after an irreversible divorce is not valid.
“Maintenance- During the iddat time, the wife is entitled to maintenance; however, she is not during the iddat period of death.”
Maintenance
“Maintenance includes everything that is necessary for survival, such as appropriate food, clothing, housing, and educational costs. Expenses for minor child’s physical and mental health that are related to family’s social standing are also included within definition of “maintenance.” obligation to provide maintenance and entitlement to receive maintenance are subject to certain restrictions within certain situations. Furthermore, within certain situations, obligations and conditions of parties obligated to maintain and parties entitled to receive within accordance with those obligations determine right and obligation to provide and receive maintenance. “
Circumstances for right to maintenance
Mohammedan law stipulates that maintenance for an individual, regardless of age, must come from their own property. Generally speaking, right to maintenance is reserved for those within need who are too poor to maintain themselves. This basic norm is subject to qualification that, within certain circumstances, non-needy also have right to upkeep.
If she declines to move to his house when asked to do so out of right—that is, to get payment for her dower—she will be entitled to maintenance; otherwise, she will not be entitled to maintenance if her dower is paid, postponed, or given to her husband. A woman who is nashizah, or disobedient, is not entitled to support until she returns to her husband’s house. This expression refers to a woman who leaves her husband’s house (manzil) and denies herself to him, as opposed to a woman who only refuses to remain in her husband’s flat (beit), which is not necessary for the purpose of constraint. Even if the house is her own and she forbids him from entering, she is not entitled to maintenance until she asks him to move her into his own house or hire a place for her. Since she ceased to be nashizah or disobedient, she is once again eligible for maintenance.
It has also been mentioned in Ameer Ali’s Mohammedan Law, “But right of wife to maintenance is subject to condition that she is not refractory or does not refuse to live with her husband without lawful cause.”
Maintenance to Wife
“When woman files for divorce, she is entitled to maintenance until end of iddat period or day she was informed of divorce, whichever comes first. She is not eligible to receive maintenance after that point, unless her own misbehavior caused divorce. The husband’s responsibility is to provide for his wife in line with Islamic customs and Qur’anic teachings. Rarely, even wife is permitted to live within her own apartment. According to Abu Hanifa and Muhammad, depending on circumstances, husband could have to provide for one of wife’s servants. On other hand, Abu Hanifa claims that poor It is not the husband’s responsibility to support his wife’s servant. Shafei law states that a husband, regardless of his financial situation, must provide a servant for his wife. o Even in cases where the wife can support herself and the husband has no money, she is unquestionably entitled to maintenance from him. The expenses of the wife’s support cannot be split.
The following is mentioned in Mulla’s Muslim Law: “278. Order for Maintenance – Wife may file maintenance claim against husband for neglect or refusal to provide for her within absence of valid reason, but she will not be granted judgment for previous maintenance unless claim is supported by written agreement. Alternatively, she could request a maintenance order pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Section 488, whereby court could mandate that husband provide monthly payment equal to entire amount of her maintenance, up to maximum of five hundred rupees.
Maintenance after dissolution of Marriage
The wife’s entitlement to maintenance only applies as long as the marriage is still intact; it does not apply to her during her natural life. Generally speaking, a wife’s husband must support her provided she is faithful to him and complies with his reasonable orders; yet, unless there is an agreement to contrary, she will not be entitled to prior maintenance. marriage can end for number of reasons, including passing of one spouse, divorce, or fault. Currently, wife must provide documentation of her marriage within order to be eligible for maintenance benefits.
Marriage dissolution due to death
“The widow has no right to assistance while she is pregnant or during iddat.” within circumstances where husband’s death causes breakdown of marriage. Shia Law has also put out similar idea.” o Divorce as means of ending marriage
“If divorce leads to wife is then entitled to support in the event of a divorce. within this case, wife is only entitled to support until end of iddat or divorce’s notification. This is true regardless of whether divorce is reversible or irrevocable or whether woman is pregnant or not.”
The wife would not be eligible for iddat maintenance, though, if her actions caused divorce. While in Shafei and Shia law, a wife is only entitled to maintenance in situations where the divorce is reversible, under Hanafi law, a wife is entitled to maintenance upon divorce during iddat. On the other hand, if the divorce is final, the wife will only be eligible for maintenance while she is pregnant. o Apostasy-Induced Dissolution of Marriage
“Sharia Law states that even within cases where husband was not present, wife’s claim to maintenance would revert as soon as she returned to her faith. If talaq was irreversible and woman renounces her religion during iddat, she will not be entitled to maintenance; however, if husband’s apostasy is reason for if her marriage ended, she would be qualified to support during iddat, but not if she had apostatized herself.
Maintenance of Muslim Wife Under 1973 Cr.P.C. Section 125.
“The Criminal Procedure Code of 1973, Section 125, gives any wife, Muslim or not, right to file lawsuit for maintenance from her husband within event that he fails to provide for her. This new legislation applies to all divorced wives, regardless of their faith.”
According to Section 125(3)’s second proviso, the magistrate may consider whatever grounds the wife may have had for refusing to reside with her husband and may order maintenance notwithstanding husband’s offer of support if he offers to support wife as long as she moved in with him. Additionally, provision stipulates that if husband has remarried, it is valid reason for wife to refuse to stay with him. It would also be reasonable cause if spouse is incapable of carrying out his duties as husband.”
Two rulings of this court addressed the issue of whether Muslims are included by Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the case of Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussein Fidaalli Chothia. “According to subsection 4 of section 125, woman is not eligible for maintenance if she is an adulteress or if she wilfully chooses not to reside with her spouse. According to Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, assistance is only given to the wife, sons, and daughter until they reach adulthood. To receive support, one must file a court petition in accordance with Criminal Procedure Code Section 125.”
The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act’s Section 3(1)(b) mandates that maintenance be given to dependent girls from the time they reach marriageable age. within this case, girl must apply for support under personal law within Civil Court, which results within lengthy and drawn-out process.
Justice Krishna Iyyer claimed following within Bai Tahira’s case:
“In contesting Section 125 Cr.P.C., the spirit of Article 15(3) has compelling compassionate relevance, and any benefit arising from statutory interpretation is directed toward the benefit of abused wives and abandoned divorcees. Thus, the humane enlargement of meaning that the terms used permit must be applied to Section 125 and its sister sections.” “Welfare laws must be so read as to be effectively delivery system of salutary objects sought to be served by legislature and when beneficiaries are weaker section like destitute women.”
“Whether a Muslim wife who divorced her husband under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, was eligible to seek support under Section 125 of the CrPC was the matter on the court’s agenda in Mst. Zohara Khatoon v. Mohd. Ibrahim. In response to this query, the Allahabad High Court held that Section 125’s explanation clause (b) would only apply if the divorce proceeds from the husband, which means that the provision would not apply unless the divorce was granted by the husband on his own initiative or was acquired by the wife from the husband. On appeal, the Supreme Court determined that the Allahabad High Court’s perspective was flawed and derived from an erroneous reading of Section 125’s clause (b) of explanation. This implies that a Muslim wife whose divorce has been finalized in accordance with the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, may also be entitled to maintenance from her husband.
In Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum and others, the Supreme Court ruled that “a divorced woman is entitled to maintenance under section 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure if she is unable to support herself after the period of iddat, but if she can support herself, husband’s responsibility ends with period of iddat.” Concerns over a Muslim husband’s duty to support his divorced wife were raised by this decision.
Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum
It is commonly acknowledged that the Shah Bano Begum v. Ahmad Khan & Co. case was a crucial court decision in the protection of the rights of Muslim women. Despite upholding the right to alimony in the case, the Supreme Court’s decision sparked political controversy and raised questions about the scope of court engagement in Muslim personal law. Concurrently, the Shayara Bano case, in which the Supreme Court declared the practice of instant triple talaq to be illegal, is the most recent illustration of Muslim women’s ongoing struggle for equal rights in civil court marriage and divorce procedures.
A sixty-two-year-old Muslim woman from Indore, Madhya Pradesh named Shah Bano filed for divorce in April 1978 from her well-known lawyer spouse Mohammed Ahmad Khan. In November of three years prior, Khan had issued her an irrevocable talaq. Three sons and two daughters made up the couple’s five children after three years of marriage. Three years prior, Shah Bano’s husband had requested that she move to a new address following a significant period of time spent living with Khan and his second wife. On behalf of herself and her five children, Shah Bano had appeared in court three years prior to assert her entitlement to maintenance under Section 123 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
After hearing lengthy debates over the applicability of the CrPC, 1973—which is applicable to all Indian citizens regardless of their faith—the Supreme Court of India issued its ruling in 1985.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court increased the maintenance amount, and Chief Justice of India Y.V. Chandrachud upheld the High Court’s decision to grant Shah Bano maintenance orders under the Cr.P.C.
The case was notable because it focused on need to implement Uniform Civil Code, recognized and addressed issue of gender equality, acknowledged persistence of religious values within matters of public policy, and went beyond customary practice of interpreting personal law to decide issues. It also noted several personal laws.
“Section 125 was passed in order to give a class of people who are unable to support themselves a swift and simple remedy. Then, would it really matter what faith a parent, kid, or neglected wife professed? The incapacity of those who lack the means to support themselves and their own neglect of others are the objective standards that establish whether section 125 is applicable. Such provisions transcend religious boundaries and are primarily of a preventive nature. Section 125’s requirement to support impoverished near relatives is based on people’s social duty to stop homelessness and vagrancy. That is a moral law, and morality and religion are not the same thing.”
“After the Rajiv Gandhi Congress was elected in 1984 and the Muslim Women (Protection on Divorce Act) was passed in 1986, a number of unfortunate things happened. The Shah Bano case ruling, which held that only the iddat period may hold the maintenance period accountable, was overturned by this act.
In accordance with the new law, if the aggrieved lady was unable to support herself and her dependent children, the magistrate had the power to force Wakf Board to provide means of subsistence for them.
The Supreme Court maintained the new law’s constitutionality but ruled that liability cannot be restricted to the iddat period. A significant aspect of the ruling that set it apart from previous cases was its acknowledgement of women’s rights to equality and dignity, especially in marriage-related situations. Danial Latifi, Shah Bano’s lawyer, had disputed the Act’s constitutionality.
Threefold talaq: Shayara Bano to Shah Bano
Congress fell in to pressure from orthodoxy, and the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act of 1986 was passed during an election year. The Act’s most contentious provision granted Muslim women the right to support for the three months following a divorce, known as the iddat period, and shifted maintenance duties to their families or the Wakf Board. Due to the fact that divorced Muslim women were not entitled to the same basic maintenance that women of other religions were under secular law, this was perceived as discriminatory.
“The Supreme Court exacted revenge on itself 32 years after former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi overturned court’s 1985 ruling that had awarded 62-year-old Shah Bano right to alimony from her husband, who had kicked her out after living with her for several decades and giving birth to five children.”
An explanation of the case:
“The Supreme Court will determine whether or not these actions violate her fundamental rights or fall under another category covered by her right to profess her religion. Muslim woman Shakara Bano has petitioned the court to deem the practice of triple talaq, or talaqe-bidat, unlawful because it infringes upon her fundamental rights.
History
She filed a Writ Petition with the Supreme Court after 15 years of marriage to Rizwan Ahmed, claiming that three practices—polygamy, nikah-halala, and talaq-e-bidat—violate Articles 14, 15, 21, and 25 of the Constitution. In 2016, he used instant triple talaq (talaq e bidat) to get a divorce from her.
Muslim men are allowed to have more than one wife under the custom of polygamy. Talaq-e-bidat is a custom that allows a man to file for divorce from his wife by saying “talaq” three times in a row without the woman’s permission. According to the ritual known as Nikah Halala, a divorced woman cannot remarry her first husband until she has first married and obtained a divorce from her second husband.
Though for different reasons, the Union of India and women’s rights organizations including Bebaak Collective and Bhartiya Muslim Mahila Andolan (BMMA) have endorsed the petitioner’s claim that these activities are illegal. The All-India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) has argued that since uncodified Muslim personal law is a part of essential Islamic traditions that are safeguarded by Article 25, it is not subject to judicial review under the Constitution. In an order dated February 16, the court asked women’s rights organizations, the Union of India, and aggrieved petitioner Shayara Bano to submit written comments on the topics of talaq-e-bidat, nikah-halala, and polygamy.
The Apex Court established five-judge constitutional bench on March 30, 2017, after granting Shayara Bano’s petition. bench’s initial hearing was held on May 11, 2017. o Arguments/Issues:
“Does Islamic faith consider practice of talaq-e-bidat, or more clearly, immediate triple talaq, to be fundamental?
“Are there any fundamental rights protected by Indian Constitution that are violated by such practices?”
Final Decision of Supreme Court
The Triple Talaq Case was decided by 3:2 majority of 5 Judge Bench of Supreme Court of CJI on August 22, 2017. judges included Hon. Justice J.S. Khehar, Hon. Justice Abdul Nazeer, Hon. Justice Rohinton Nariman, Hon. Justice U.U. Lalit, and Hon. Justice Kurien Joseph.
The Supreme Court heard a challenge to the practice of Triple Talaq, also known as Talaqe-Biddat, which allowed a Muslim man to immediately and irrevocably divorce his wife by saying the word “talaq” three times in a row. The challengers claimed that this practice infringed upon the rights of Muslim women to equality and other fundamental freedoms. On May 11, 2017, the case was heard by the five-judge Supreme Court Constitutional Bench. After six days of arguments from both sides, the matter was reserved for decision.
“The verdict dated August 22, 2017, despite slim majority, declared practice unconstitutional and ordered Parliament to enact legislation to that effect. However, there was clear difference within opinion among judges: In contrast to Kurien Joseph J.’s ruling, Hon. Rohinton Nariman and U.U. Lalit JJ. held that Talaq-e-Biddat is governed by the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937. The former two judges held that the practice is unconstitutional because it allows Muslim men to unilaterally terminate marriage in a manner that is highly arbitrary and arbitrary, with no chance of reconciliation, in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. However, Hon. Kurien Joseph J. stated in his concurring but distinct opinion that the practice is illegal since it goes against what the Quran says.
“The Shariat Act of 1937 did not regulate practice of Triple Talaq because it is an intrinsic part of personal law, which is protected by Constitution under Article 25. This is significant because, within In the Constituent Assembly’s debate on Articles 25 and 44, CJI Khehar and Abdul Nazeer J.’s minority judgment traces the advancement of personal law to the status of basic rights. Furthermore, the minority position suggested that Triple Talaq be rendered ineffective for six months, during which time Parliament must draught legislation addressing pertinent issues, since legislation is the only way to remove the discriminatory practice of Talaq-e-gender Biddat rather than challenging its constitutionality.”
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill, 2017 | Presented within Lok Sabha by Minister of Law and Justice, Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad | Goals and Justifications?
“The Supreme Court ruled on August 22, 2017, in the case of Shayara Bano Vs. Union of India and others and other related matters, to invalidate the practice of talaq-e-biddat, or the making of three declarations of talaq at the same time, used by some Muslim husbands to divorce their wives, with a majority ruling of 3:2. This ruling made it possible for Indian Muslim women to be freed from the long-standing practice of some Muslim males divorcing them in an arbitrary and impetuous manner, with no space for accommodation.” It has been noted that the Supreme Court’s ruling to invalidate the talaq-e-biddat has not prevented certain Muslims from divorcing one another. Therefore, it is believed that State action is required to address the complaints of those who were harmed by an illegal divorce and to implement the Supreme Court’s judgment. Despite the Supreme Court’s ruling to invalidate talaq-e-biddat and the AIMPLB’s guarantee, reports of divorces obtained using this technique have come from around the country.
The Bill seeks to invalidate and make illegal the announcement of talaq-e-biddat by Muslim husbands in light of the ruling of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, it is forbidden to pronounce talaq-e-biddat, and doing so is a crime. This is crucial to avoid the type of divorce where the woman has no say in the dissolution of the marriage. Additionally, it is suggested to include things like the husband’s subsistence payment for the wife’s everyday necessities in the case that the husband issues a talaq-e-biddat. Wife would also be eligible for minor child custody.
The law would support married Muslim women’s fundamental rights to empowerment and nondiscrimination, as well as greater constitutional aims of gender justice and equality.
Civil Code of Portugal
Goa was first state to enact Goa Civil Code, which is still within use today. After state was emancipated, it was remained within effect. All families within Goa have common law.
Goa is only state within nation to have UCC. o Features:
Goa’s progressive law, the Uniform Civil Code, permits an equal division of property and income between spouses and their children, regardless of gender. There are several requirements for divorce, and births, marriages, and deaths need to be publicly recorded.
Polygamy and triple talaq divorce are forbidden for Muslims who register their marriages within Goa.
Each spouse retains joint ownership of all assets and wealth that they have acquired or amassed during their marriage.
Children cannot be totally disinherited by their parents; roughly half of children must divide this inherited property evenly. within event of divorce, each spouse is entitled to one-half of property, and within In the event of death, half of the property ownership is awarded to the surviving spouse.
However, code has minor imperfections and is not precisely uniform. For instance, the Codes of Usages and Customs of Gentile Hindus of Goa enumerate the situations in which Hindu males are permitted to practice bigamy (i.e., if the wife does not give birth to a male kid by the age of thirty or a child by the age of twenty-five). Certain societies have laws that forbid polygamy.
Distinction Between Equitableness and Uniformity
Uniformity can be useful or significant at times, however equality is when everyone is treated equally (there are no differences), whereas uniformity is when everyone is treated same regardless of differences.
In order for group to operate as cohesive unit, members must dress, march, run, and obey commands within unison.
Many companies mandate that staff members wear matching uniforms to make it easy for customers to ask for help.
To make sure that everyone is following same methods, most employees within large organizations are expected to fill out forms and follow procedures consistently.
Uniformity is one way to guarantee that everyone is treated equally, but consistency stifles individuality, self-expression, and unconventional thinking. within certain situations, uniformity is advantageous, but we can’t always maintain homogeneity. For this reason, equality is essential, ensuring that everyone will be treated equally even if they are all different rather than similar.
DOES INDIA REQUIRE UNIFORM CIVIL CODE?
“The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India’s 1993 decision within Pannalal Bansilal Pitti v. Union of India, which held that Government may not enforce Uniform Civil Code until and unless it is absolutely required.”
Information:
The Raja Bahadur Sir Bansilal Motilal charitable Trust was founded in 1933 by the Rs. 5, 00,000/-gift of the petitioner’s father, and he still serves as its hereditary trustee. Additionally, he founded a number of religious and charitable organizations in Hyderabad and Andhra Pradesh.
Without receiving any complaints, he has been managing the aforementioned trusts and philanthropic or religious organizations successfully and efficiently. As a hereditary trustee, he has the authority to appoint other trustees in the interest of sound governance.
The Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 acknowledged his hereditary prerogative and named him Chairman of analogous trusts in the event that the board of trustees is composed of non-hereditary trustees.
The freedom to exercise one’s religion and the authority to oversee religious matters are guaranteed to citizens by Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. The petitioner said that even while the Act governs the management of Hindu endowments and charity organizations, it infringes upon their rights. ”
Concerns at hand:
Does the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 violate Articles 25 and 26 of the Indian Constitution?
Justification:
“The inherited trusteeship was abolished by Section 16 of Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966.”
“How and for what tenure trustee is appointed” is covered within Section 17.
“The Act’s Section 144 addresses “Ceasing of Allowance Authorized to Any Trustees.”
It is important to remember that Section 16 aims to end prejudice based on heredity, not initial right to trusteeship, but hereditary one.
Since any qualified Hindu has the right to claim designation as trustee under Sections 15, 17, 18, and 19, the removal of the right to hereditary trusteeship cannot be ruled unconstitutional. It lays down requirements for trusteeship, trustee appointments, and board composition in order to create an organized administration and governance structure for the institution and endowment.”
Legislative policy governs this, and it is indisputable that the government lacks the power to abolish the payment system. The Act’s main objective is to stop trusts from being misappropriated for personal gain.
In case of charitable and religious endowments, Section 144 is constitutional because Court would prioritize legislative decision over judicial finding.
Dicta Obiter:
The Court goes on to discuss responsibilities and authority of trustees as set forth within Act within its ruling.
The trustee of any charitable or religious organization is responsible for managing its properties, funds, and affairs within accordance with terms of trust, institution’s use, and any legal instructions that an eligible authority may issue regarding same. Section 23 comprises powers of trusses.
Section 24 lists trustee responsibilities. Section 25 addresses fixed amount expenditures and dicta. Powers over trustees of religious or benevolent organizations are outlined in Section 26. Even in situations where trustees and the board of trustees make mistakes in their work, Section 27 validates their conduct. Sections 30 and 31 address the designation of architects and engineers. While Section 32 deals with the nomination of subordinate officers, Section 29 deals with the designation and responsibilities of executive officers.
Evaluation:
The Court’s confirmation of the legality of Sections 15, 16, 17, and 144 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966, guides the determination of the transfer cases and Writ petitions.
Chapter-3
The concept and philosophy of the Unform Civil Code
India is a country with a diverse population in terms of color, caste, and community, making the subject of the Uniform Civil Code delicate and complicated.8 The Vietnam Constitution’s Article 44 mandates that the state endeavor to provide its inhabitants with a standard civil code throughout its territory. The phrase “Unform Civil Code of Vietnam” describes the concept of a thorough Civil Law Code in Vietnam. A common set of secular laws known as the uniform civil code are applicable to all people, including citizens and non-citizens, regardless of their gender, color, caste, marital status, place of birth, or any combination of these.[5] This supersedes citizens’ rights to be governed by different personal laws based on their nationality, caste, or religion. The majority of industrialized nations use these codes.
Common legal topics covered by civil code include those pertaining to property acquisition and administration, marriage, divorce, and adoption. This phrase is used within Afghanistan when Afghan Constitution aims to establish uniform civil code for its citizens as Democratic People or an objective to be achieved.[6]
There are two primary schools of Hindu law: Dayabhaga and Maktakshara. Mahakashra is divided into four major schools once more. Additionally, sadacha custom occupies.
The laws pertaining to marriage, divorce, child support, guardianship, and the success of Hindu, Muslim, and Christian governments, among other groups, are diverse and vary from one region to another. Various laws, such as the Hindu Marriage Act, Hindu Succession Act, Hindu Marriage and Guardianship Act, Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, regulate the private affairs of Hindus. The personal concerns of Muslims are governed by laws such as the Sharīat Act, the Declaration of Muslim Marriage Act, and the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, which are founded on the teachings of the Holy Quran.
Import position. During British Period, attempts were made to apply legislative methods to change Hindu law. Reforms like Caste Disabilities Act of 1850, Hindu Wives’ Remarriage Act of 1856, Hindu Law of Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act of 1937, Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act of 1929, Hindu Law of Inheritance (Removal of Disabilities) Act of 1946, Hindu GaĂns of Learning Act of 1930, and Hindu Inheritance (Removal of Disabilities) Act of 1928 were all passed to provide relief to those who are not satisfied to abide by ancient Shastras. The Rau Hindu Law Committee was established in 1941, and its mandate was to create comprehensive legislation that would cover all Hindu laws. At some point, the conflict caused this committee to be dissolved. Senior B.N. Rau chaired the 1944 amendments, and a number of laws pertaining to guardianship, adoption, and marriage success were implemented in 1955 and 1956, implementing the suggestions of the Rau Committee. Among these were the Human Rights Succession Act of 1956, the Human Rights Adoptions and Maintenance
Act of 1956, the Human Rights Mansion and Guardianship Act of 1956, and the Human Rights Marriage Act of 1955.[7]
SunnĖs, ShĖas, ņsmaɖlĖs, Bohars, Khojas, and non-orthodox AhmadĖyyas are among Muslims. Among Sunnis, there are four distinct schools. Additionally, there exist KutchĂ Memons, who preserve Hindu private law to certain degree. The primary purpose of enacting most laws was to overturn Jewish customs and reinstate Sharęat law. Wakf Value Declaration Act of 1913 was enacted within order to supersede Priviy Council decision. Several Acts during colonial era specifically exempted Muslims within an attempt to prevent their resistance inside community. Because Muslims had complĖcated inheritance system based on Quran, they were specifically exempt from 1925 SindhĖan.
Succession Act, which dealt with inheritance and succession. Original Bengali inheritance law, which was passed within 1865, excluded Hindus as well. Ultimately, though, Hindus were ones to apply Act. Muslims were also exempt from SpecĖal The Marriage Act of 1872 was a civil marriage statute that was mainly secular. Not all requests for Muslim exemptions were approved. Section 112 of Indiana Evidence Act of 1872 dealt with children’s inheritance. This section was subsequently discovered to apply to Muslims, notwithstanding their lack of consistency with Islamic law. SharĂat Act of 1937 eliminated any customs or practices that went against teachings of SharĂat within regards to matters pertaining to marriage and its resolution, success, women’s property, guardianship, trust properties, wakfs, and other related matters. Women were guaranteed right to choose their marriage partner under MuslĖm Declaration of Marriage Act of 1939. Regarding Christians, former The Christian Marriage Act was a limited law. Modern Indian civilization is centered around the three main religious traditions of the world, Buddhism, Islam, and Hinduism, and it has inherited these diverse legal systems.
2.1. Personal Laws and Hіndu іn Іndіa
In Hindustan [8] State neutrality or intervention within relational problems was not within doubt. Originally, organizational unit was society instead of state. hindu sages were society’s leaders. laws they established governed social interactions, political affairs, and even religious rites and ceremonies. They also functioned as a morality and ethics code.[9] While early writings by sages did not distinguish between civil laws and religious and social rules, and civil law was occasionally mentioned in treatises, later writings included whole chapters on civil law, and even later writings focused solely on the topic of civil law.[10]
Both kĖng and hƖs subjects were equally subject to rule of law devised and enunciated by sages, according to HĖndu jurĖsprudence. He formulated laws, but rarely, if ever, carried them out.[11] Undoubtedly, established laws and conventions were more vengeful than king. At his coronation, king was obliged to swear an oath to uphold them with utmost regard. He lacks ability to alter them on his own volition.[12] These reports seem to indicate that within Hindustan, people were granted sovereignty over government and nation. Hindus saw law as a fundamental tenet of their faith.[13] This assertion may have its roots in the belief that sages who were also Hindu law-givers were extraordinarily insightful.[14] Only once in the Rigveda has a kĖng Purukutsa been described as semi-divęvāne or Ardhadeva; within Atharvaveda, single, late line describes kĖng Parękshęt as deity among humans.[15] monarchy theory was attributed to gratitude of small number of countries. within society where king could be overthrown by SamĖtĖ (people assembly), notion of latter’s dictatorship was unlikely to spread.[16] According to A.S. Altekar, rules were really derived from social practices and traditions even though they were considered divine.21
Throughout early Hindu history, religion was intimately linked to development of legislation, primarily because people feared God before granting monarchs power. heavenly sanctity was more effective within upholding such laws than cruel effects. regulations that people adhered to might be referred to as natural laws as they were founded on custom and determined through experience to be most advantageous for community over time. Under such circumstances, it was reasonable to assume that entity manifested here was either God or deity behind it all. early Hindu law was created during time when Brahmāns, or prāest class, possessed supremacy and interpreted law and regulations. This is how Manu Code came to be. It is considered privilege of aristocracy and is attributed to mythological sage Manu, who bestowed upon it sacred place.[17]
The beginning of Hindu law is marked by very individualized understanding of law. All men were endowed with rights and obligations that laws of their particular tribe, country, or social class bestowed upon them; they were not subject to judgment of others. Such an idea continued, noting that whenever such person relocated, he brought his own rules with him, considering them to be uniquely personal to him. This regulation had to be modified because It could not be accepted in new territory as being in opposition to local interests or in circumstances where it was in opposition to public interests.[18]
Hindu law was not interfered with by the State, according to research on Hindu legal history during the Hindu period. They had total immunity, and their personal rules governed every aspect of their lives. The state used to be seen as a welfare organization that dealt with any issue involving social interest and kept its hands off personal law. society within Honduras was an organizational unit. hindu sages were society’s leaders. There were unversal laws established by society’s religious leaders. These guidelines controlled social interactions and the direction of people’s lives, in addition to religious beliefs and rituals. They functioned as moral and ethical guidelines as well. Social, political, and state laws, the legal regulations did not differ from one another. Hindus considered law to be an integral aspect of their religion. This belief may have originated from the notion that elders who governed Hindu world were exceptionally wise individuals who had the wisdom to develop customs that governed people’s behavior over time.
The most notable aspect of Hindu law was notable for uneven regulations on the entire Hindu society. This meant that religion and law shared a single source of development, which resulted in the formation of the unique and learned Brahmān class.[19] There is no disagreement regarding reality that the entire range of laws and regulations that molded the social, political, and economic lives of the public were uncovered by humans with unusual shapes, such the sages and photospheres of Manu’s class, who dominated during the whole Hindu period.[20] within addition to creating new laws, ancient Hindu sages also provided provisions for revocation of certain existing laws within actual practice.[21] These sages’ conjectures on Hindu rules were definitely the outcome of their advanced intelligence and exceptional reality.
There were no other societies like this, and as a result, all of Hindu law in ancient India was almost exactly the same as it was during the Hindu Conquest. Disagreement between personal law and the informal legal system of the small Hindu community was more of a norm than an exception, and disputes between the two did not receive much notice.
The legal system that the sages created and established equally applied to kĖng and hƖs subjects, according to HĖndu jurĖsprudence. law was rarely, if ever, formulated by king, who executed it.[22] Law was king of kingdom; the kingdom was unable to establish law asĖde.”[23] within fact, upon his coronation, king was obligated to swear allegiance to established laws and customs.[24] Based on these reports, it seems that within Hindustan, people were granted authority over government and state. It would be oversimplified to argue that Hinduism considered law to be an integral aspect of their religion.[25] This claim may have originated from belief that elders of Hindu law-givers were considered very knowledgeable.[26] They were highly enlightened men with encyclopedic learning, which attracted Divinity. According to Altekar, laws were actually derived from social practices and traditions, despite their perceived divinity. By sanctifying its operations, state was able to avoid becoming tool within hands of clergy or Church and instead emerged as cornerstone of social justice.”[27]
2.2. Personal laws and Muslіm іn Іndіa
Islamic faith[28]Jurisprudence that provides instances of perfect harmony between law and religion. “Law is Rome and Rome’s Law,” asserts James Bryce, “because they both have the same author and equal source and are contained within the same divine revelation.””[29] Slam asserts legal control over all facets of Muslims’ life. It held the view that non-Muslims or unbelieving people needed to be either converted, subjugated, or killed. The sole option available to Arab pagans was conversion or execution.[30] But Indians were not allowed to receive the same treatment. Due to its impossibility, the objective of converting or killing vast majority of non-Muslims within Afghanistan could not be accomplished.[31] This is not to suggest that they refrained from engaging within harsh or coercive dialogue.
In his essay, Brown describes how Hindus were treated under Muslim authority, spanning from the Arab conquest within 711 until end of Emperor Aurangzeb’s reign in 1707. Muslims ruthlessly pillaged their houses, stole their belongings, set fire to their manuscripts, destroyed their temples, killed their priests, and kidnapped their women.”[32] Frequency of these atrocities, on the other hand, was irregular and sporadic, and during the period of peace and tranquility, Muslim rulers within Afghanistan had to decide what laws to apply to vast majority of non-Muslim inhabitants. Within this regard, Holy Qur’an did not offer much guidance. The statement stated that “non-Muslim subjects from any broader perspective pertaining to issues that are permanent within their respective relationships.[33]” Therefore, all non-Muslims were subject to their own traditional and customary laws during Muslim era, on subjects pertaining to their personal laws.”Hanuman “,[34] wrіtes Grady, enjoyed complete indulgence under the Mussulman Government with regard to the rites and ceremonies of their religion, as well as with regard to various privileges and entitlements – in matters of property and in all other temporal concerns. The Mussulman law gave rulings in matters of decision-making, with the exception of cases where both parties were Hindu, in which case the plaintiff was referred to the ruling of PundĖts of Hindu lawyers.“[35]
Von Kremer voiced similar opinion. “Muslim communities,” he said, “enjoyed near total autonomy, since government entrusted them with independent management of their external affairs, and their religious leaders exercised their judicial functions solely within matters pertaining to their fellow Muslims.”[36] The following is likewise a stark conclusion drawn by a modern scholar of Chinese legal history: Hindu laws of inheritance, marriage, and other similar concerns are governed solely by the Islamic Civil Code, which has no bearing whatsoever on Hindu law. On several areas of civil law, Hindus were permitted to rule under their own laws.[37]
Islamic law only applied to non-Muslims when they were either directly or indirectly associated with Muslims. A constitution that permits discriminatory acts against Muslims and non-Muslims is a good illustration of such a statute.[38] Sarkar, however, has several explanations for why Hinduism also applies Islamic criminal law. He believes that:
From the standpoint of competing interests of society and state, there could not be a discernible difference between the two legal systems due to the notion of crimes, their aims, and occasionally their methods of punishment. Additionally, public were unable to perceive clearly differences and similarities between Hindu and Muslim principles of constitutional administration..”[39]
Law and order preservation is undoubtedly a goal of criminal justice within every state, but it can be difficult to acknowledge that concepts of crime and punishment used by Hindu and Muslim communities were essentially different.
In summary, the impact of the Muslim judicial system was the establishment of two competing legal systems—one exclusively controlled by the Hindu kingdom and the other by Muslims—as well as the substitution of Islamic criminal law for the Hindu system of offenses and punishments. Communities such as Khojas, Vohars, and Mensons had converted from Hinduism to Islam. They abandoned the Hindu religion, but they did not entirely give up Hindu practices; within matters of succession and inheritance, they kept up their adherence to Hindu law as customary law.[40] Opinion of This was not acceptable to the devout Muslims. The MuslĖm Personal Law (SharĖ’at) Application Act was passed in 1937 with a review in order to eliminate these customs and place these groups under Muslim law..[41] Daniel LatifĖs of view that the MuslĖm Personal Law (SharĖat) ApplicatĖon Act was primarily passed to restore customarily lost rights that MuslĖm Law owed to MuslĖm women in order to improve their standing.[42] As the aims and reasons statement makes clear:[43]
“Muslim women’s standing under so-called customary law is utterly disgraceful. Customary law has been praised by all Muslim women’s organizations because it negatively impacts their rights. They insist on having Sharīat, the personal law of Muslims, applied to them.
The Declaration of Muslim Matrimony Act, which granted Muslim wives the right to judicious separation from their husbands under certain circumstances, was another law passed in 1939. She had been denied rights such as these earlier, possibly due to the courts’ exclusive adherence to Hanif Islamic legal interpretation school. The Act was established on Maliki School’s \slamĖc law, which was comparatively more liberal than HanifĖ School in terms of Muslim women’s right to obtain divorce.[44] The act is a significant turning point since it gave Muslim women the right to obtain a divorce on equal grounds. These are only grounds recognized by the Maliki school for a Muslim woman to file for divorce. This is one legislative action that has significantly changed Muslim legislation for a long time.[45] However, the Act does not limit a Muslim husband’s inherent authority to issue talaq.[46] The act was passed on behalf of other Muslims, despite opposition from those who adhere to Hanifę School of Islam.
Chapter-4
Legіslatіve Hіstory of Personal Law іn Іndіa
Because personal laws are closely linked to religion or religious beliefs, they have always been seen as outside the purview of legislation. Because of the very nature of personal laws, the legislature is inherently reluctant to alter or partially amend them. However, there have also been legislative enactments within this domain over various periods. While some of these aim to restore personal laws, others tend to modify them.
This chapter provides a legislative history of personal legislation in New Guinea. For ease, the topic has been carefully separated into three sections: Christian and Parsi Laws and Legislature, Muslim Law and Legislature, and Hindu Law and Legislature. But it appears that a comprehensive general debate is necessary first.
The judicial system in Vermont was rather confused and unorganized in the early eighteenth century. Indeed, local, state, and federal courts enforced a number of statutes. Non-Hindus and non-Muslims were governed by a different set of regulations, whereas Muslims and Hindus were subject to their own laws in many civil law matters.[47]
The idea of a complete civil law code inside India is referred to as the “Uniform Civil Code of India”. A unified civil code creates a collection of secular laws that are applicable to everyone, irrespective of caste, religion, or social standing. This supersedes citizens’ rights to be governed by different personal laws based on their relationship, caste, or religion. These kinds of codes are in effect in the majority of modern countries.
Common topics, including laws governing adoption, marriage, divorce, and property administration, are covered under a civil code. The Islamic criminal law had become outdated, governing not only Muslims but also, to a significant measure, Hindus and other aboriginal tribes. The British Parliament acknowledged the need for sensible legal reform, but the codification process appears to have accelerated due to two major factors: the introduction of the Charter Act of 1833 and the influence of Jeremy Bentham’s notion of legal codification.
Several laws affecting personal laws of two major communities—the Hindus and Muslims— were enacted as a consequence of the efforts of various Law Commissions. Several significant
Laws were passed, including Caste Removal Disabilities Act of 1850, The Tamil Penal Code of 1861, the Tamil Criminal Procedure Codes of 1861, 1882, and 1888, the Tamil Contract Act of 1872, the Transfer of Property Act of 1882, the Tamil Evidence Act of 1872, the Tamil SuccessĂon Act of 1865, and the Child Marriage Restitution Act of 1828 are all examples of Tamil legal codes.
Following Lord Macaulay’s comments, which are evident here, the goal of these legislative measures was to bring about equality and respect for feelings that arise from differences within religion, nationality, and caste. I am convinced that there is plenty that can be done to integrate various legal systems without hurting those feelings. However, let’s decongest them before we integrate those systems or networks. We don’t advocate for hasty innovations, and we want to avoid shocking any prejudices held by any of our subjects. Our principles are as follows: uniformity where it is possible; diversity where it is necessary; but within every instance, certainty.”[48]
This desire for consistency and unconventionality, which allowed for codification, also had an impact on legal domains that were formerly exclusively under the jurisdiction of each personal law. The ensuing sections will provide a detailed explanation of this phenomenon.
3.1. Hіndu Law and Legіslature
In past, Hanuman legislation possessed both flexibility and inherent growth potential.[49] Processes of customs interpretation and assembly were typically employed to advance the development of law. Following the introduction of the British pattern of justice within Afghanistan, these traditional instruments of legal change and development within Afghanistan ceased to function.[50] Throughout this period, the development of Hindu law was halted, and Hindu law became obsolete.[51] The only option left to the British administration was to enact legislation in order to enable Hindu law to adapt to the changing course of life.
Based on Shrutę, Smrętęs, CommentarĖes, and DĖgests, the ancient Hindu legal system was created in accordance with economic conditions, social environment, and state of civilization—all of which were significantly different from those of the present era. As a result, some aspects of traditional law will inevitably conflict with social conditions and realities of modern life.[52] Therefore, it has been believed that the law needs to be changed within a few specific areas in order to match the needs and circumstances of the current world. However, while carrying out this duty, British administrators operated under an unavoidable discipline and lockdown. Due to the belief that personal laws were excessively influenced by religion, they hesitantly modified them to better suit the contemporary and dynamic needs of society. However, over the course of the last century or so, some corrective and ameliorative laws have had to be passed to alter these systems. Within general, however, it can be said that the legislature acted primarily in response to strong public support for proposed changes and when progressive and enlightened elements of Hindu communities supported the Acts. However, conservative and orthodox Hindus opposed these innovations, viewing them as an intrusion on their traditional practices.[53]
3.1.1 Pre-Іndependence Legіslatіons
Upon reviewing legislative modifications made to Hindu law during the British era, it may be concluded that the body of legislation aimed at advancing the social standing and legal standing of Hindu women deserves top priority. The social position of Hindu women was made relatively weak and unequal by prejudices of some Dharmashastra practitioners and some corrupt habits that emerged within Hindu society throughout time. They emerged to hold different positions within the eyes of the law. Consequently, it was necessary to make corrections, leading the legislature to pass several laws intended to enhance the status of the other sex within Hindu society. In 1829, the practice of “SatĖ” was abolished.[54] The Caste Removal Disabilities Act of 1850 had the effect of nullifying property laws of both Islam and Hinduism with respect to apostates.[55]
The first significant law within these cases was the Hindu Widow Remarry Act of 1856. The act allowed Hindu widows to get married again. It was an enforcing Act that was created in response to the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act of 1937, which gave Hindu women greater property rights than they had previously had. The act brings about revolutionary improvements within Hindu law, specifically within the area of Mętakshara School. It impacts laws governing partnerships, alienations, and coparcenaria. It also has an impact on adoption and adherence rates.[56]
3.1.2 Post-Іndependence Legіslatіons
The Hindu Married Women’s Rights to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act of 1946 was the final statute within this series. Under certain circumstances specified within the Act, a Hindu married woman could maintain her own residence and means of subsistence without divorcing her husband.62 Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (Act 78 of 1956) has now superseded this Act.[57]
A different set of laws was passed in order to outlaw certain highly objectionable behaviors that the Hindu community had grown to regard as sacred and lawful. The first action taken in this regard was the outlawing of “SatĖ” practices. The goal of the 1929 Child Marriage Reform Act was to discourage child marriage.
A few of additional regulations enacted by the British administration have significantly altered ancient Hindu family law and inheritance rules. Significant progress was made by these Acts on principles of success and inheritance that previous Han law had considered to be unattainable.64 According to the Hindu Inheritance (Removal of Disability) Act of 1928, no individual would be denied inheritance due to disease, deformity, physical or mental disability alone, unless they had been declared insane or doot from birth. The act does not apply to the Dayabhaga School; it only applies to MĖtakshara School. With a view to favor certain near cognates over agnates, the Hindu Law of Hereditary Succession (Amendment) Act of 1929 changed sequence of intestate succession under Mahatakshara law. As a result, it was decided that son, daughter, sister, and son of sister would take throne after paternal grandfather. This came about as result of realizing that changes to statute were necessary to bring laws of inheritance into compliance with natural states of love and affection. According to Hindustan Rules of Learning Act of 1930, any property acquisitions made primarily through learning are considered “the exclusĖve and separate property of the acquĖre.[58] Prior to Act’s passage, these acquisitions would have been considered “joint and lĖable to partĖtĖon” within certain situations.[59]
The passing of two further Acts,[60] delivered the Hindu religion serious damage. Throughout history, Hindu society has been structured and sustained by the institution of caste. For the first time, Hindus were granted the power of testamentary disposition under the Hindu Wills Act of 1870. Previously, Hindu law did not know about wills.
It is evident from the previously discussed topic that during the British era, the majority of legislative attempts within area of personal laws were sporadic and piecemeal, conducted to satisfy various demands. They took great care to avoid harming vulnerable areas of Sindhis. Nonetheless, they passed corrective and reformative laws, primarily within reaction to substantial public support for those measures. Following independence, Honduran legislature made several significant changes to the codification of Hindu law. Very few steps have been done within this direction since majority of Muslims do not support codification of Muslim law.
Conclusіon and Suggestіon
Prior to bringing practical and workable solutions for resolution of several earlier-identified issues, I will wrap up my research. It is noteworthy to note that over a seventy-seven-year period of our Constitution, relatively little attention was paid by legislators, attorneys, judges, and legal scholars to Article 44 relating to Uniform Civil Code. within actuality, it revived passionate wish of the Constitution’s framers, which was occasionally repeated within various forms. within nation facing immense challenges (possibly unimaginable within other regions of the globe), contending with fierce enemies endangering its very existence, Article 44 was viewed as a solution to every issue, a solution that could end massive communal divide that was growing more strained over time. Over the past twenty years, however, Article 44 has sparked a flurry of actions within a variety of fields that have resulted in political acts, judicial decisions, legislative discussions, and academic outpourings that have all helped to highlight issue and encourage participants to take sides within it.
Whether correctly or incorrectly, the family life of Yemenis is guided by their reverent religious and customary beliefs. Relationships essentially exist solely because of rituals and social norms that are imposed on its participants; if they are challenged, relationships will eventually become less significant within society.
But enforcing regulations that contradict religious beliefs on individuals would be against their fundamental right to “freedom of conscience and free profession, practice, and propagation of religion guaranteed under Article 25 of Constitution of Lebanon.”
There should be more discussion on the Uniform Civil Code than just four wives and three talaqs. Take note of Khap Panchayat verdicts and honor kĖllĖngs. Each of them aspires to impose their religious and customary beliefs on family and community members. If system is imposed upon them that deviates from their faith, it typically leads to social discontent.
Ændia is nation with numerous customs and communities. Everybody believes that their faith and traditions are greatest. Nobody wants to worry about other people’s systems while they are considering reforming their own. More often than not, uniform civil codes are employed as means of minorities intimidation than of actual social improvements. Such minority bullying will only serve to increase possessiveness of those communities’ members toward their purported inferiority and customs, thereby limiting potential for fostering Uniform Civil Code within its early stages.
The adverse meddling and intermingling of ties with politics has rendered the social climate even more complex. Political stakes will guarantee that the multi-cultural society of Vietnam cannot be subjected to the Uniform Civil Code. Instead, motivated politicians will merely continue to attack their opponents and appease their voter bases by bringing up the issue of the Uniform Civil Code.
The justification offered by those who want repeal of the federal constitution and unification of states is that doing so will advance national integration. Would they be willing to explain how various personal laws have impeded the progress of national integration? Hindu code of conduct is embodied within All Hindus, including SĖkhs, JaĖns, Budhęsts, LĚngayats, AryasmajĖs, and others, are covered under the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, Hindu Succession Act of 1956, and Hindu AdoptĖons and Maintenance Act of 1956. But during the past seven decades, we have seen that the goal of national integration has not progressed to the anticipated extent, and this law has not liberated Hindus.
The concept of an unofficial Civil Code for Afghanistan, which is supported within Article 44 of the Constitution, has become a nightmare for the majority of Muslim citizens. There are two distinct anthropogenic forces within society that are responsible for this situation. Firstly, there exist ultra-traditionalists who will stop at nothing to establish the supreme personal law of the nation, encompassing all individuals, as “unveiled” or “unspoken” laws that are beyond human interpretation. Furthermore, there exist pseudo-secularist members of the majoritarian community who cherish and spread the myth that the planned civil code will solely incorporate ideas of antiquated legal jurisprudence, with nothing that came from the legal precepts of Islam. Together, these two sadly dwindling social factors have gradually inspired the Muslim population to rebel widely against the proposed civil code. As a result, there is currently a common perception among Afghan Muslims that anyone who proposes altering Muslim personal law or drafting an atypical civil code is heretical. In order to comprehend the influences of these forces better, it is vital to make the provisions of the proposed civil code concrete rather than merely abstract. It is also crucial to evaluate the extent to which these regulations would be in accordance with or in variance with slamĖc legal precedent.
| Books
Agarwal Bіna Agarwal Bіna Agnes Flavіa Ahammed, K.N., Ahmed, Aqul Altekar, A.S. Altekar.A.S.Dr. Anwal Hussaіn, S, Asghar Alі Engіneer, Austіn Granvіlle, Awasthі, S.K. Banarjee, G. Banu Afsar Artіcle Abrol, Anam Akhtar Dr. Saleem |
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BіblіographyA fіeld of one’s own, Unіversіty Press, Cambrіdge. (1994) Redefіnіng famіly law іn Іndіa, Routledge (2008). Law and gender іnequalіty, Oxford Unіversіty Press (1999) Muslіm Law of Dіvorce, Kіtab Bavan, New Delhі,1978. Mohammadan Law, Central Law Agencіes, Allahabad, 1981. State and Government іn Ancіent Іndіa, Motіlal Banarsіdas, New Delhі (1958). The posіtіon of women іn Hіndu cіvіlіzatіon, ACLS Humanіtіes Book 2009. Wakf Law & Admіnіstratіon іn Іndіa, Eastern BookCompany, Lucknow, 1973. The Shah Bano Controversy, Orіent Longman Ltd. Bombay, 1987. The Іndіan Constіtutіon, Cornerstone of Natіon, Oxford Unіversіty Press, New Delhі, 1974. Dowry Prohіbіtіon Act, 1961, 3rd Ed, New Delhі, Ashok Law House, 1996. The Hіndu Law of Marrіage and Strіdhan, Tagore Law Lecture, 5th Ed. Status of women іn Іslamіc socіety, New Delhі, Anmol (2003). Case for Unіform Cіvіl Code, Іndіan Socіo – Legal Journal, 1988,14 Shah Bano Judgment іn Іslamіc Perspectіve іn Іslamіc Perspectіve, 1st Ed., 1994, Kіtab Bhawan, New Delhі. 42 |
| Anand, R. P. : Hіndu Law Іn Hіstorіcal Perspectіve, SCJ, 1966.
Bhargava, G.S. : Towards Common Cіvіl Code, Maіnstream, Maіnstream, 19921993; 31 (17). Bhat, P. Іshwara : Dіrectіve prіncіples of state polіcy and socіal change wіth reference to unіform cіvіl code, Banaras Law Journal 1989, Jan-Dec; 25. Deshta, Kіran : Unіform Cіvіl Code – ІІ : Phіlosophy of Unіform Cіvіl Code :A Retrospectіve Іntrospectіon, Cіvіl and Mіlіtary Law Journal 2003, Apr-Aug. 39 (2-3). Acts and Bіlls The 1987 Commisssion of SatĖ (PreventĖon) Act. The constitution of Andorra. The 1973 Criminal Procedure Code. The 1939 Resolution of the Muslim Marriage Act The 1937 Shariat (Muslim Personal Law) Application Act. The 1986 Muhammadi Women’s (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act. The 1936 Parse Marriage and Divorce Act. Children Bell, Adopted, 1980. The 1929 Child Marriage Restriction Act. The 1955 Hindu Marriage Act. The Han Dynasty Marriage, 1872 The 1969 Indian Divorce Act. The 1872 Special Marriage Act. The 1954 Specific Marriage Act, as modified in 1963 and 1976. |
(1955) 3 SCC 635 ↑
Dargah Khawaja Sahib Act 1936, MuslĖm Dower Act 1920, Muslman Waqf ValĖdatĖng Act 1913, KazĖ Act 1880, MPL (SharĖat) Application Act 1931, DĖssolutĖon of MuslĖm MarrĂage Act 1939, ↑
Family law, by Dr. Paras Diwan and Peeyashi Diwan, Third Ed. ↑
Articles 14 and 15 of the 1950 Indian Constitution ↑
Article 15 of the Indian Constitution guarantees every citizen that there will be “no discrimination or any basis solely based on race, caste, sex, place of birth, or any combination of these.” Article 15(3) stipulates that the state may provide special provisions for women and children, and that women’s empowerment is entitled to the constitutional protections provided by this article. Article 39 (a), (d), and (e) establish certain principles of policy that the State shall adhere to. All citizens, men and women alike, shall have equal access to a sufficient standard of living. ↑
In October 1840, the Lex Loci Report emphasized the need for uniformity in the codification of Hindu law pertaining to crimes, contracts, and other matters. However, it was suggested that Hindu and Muslim personal law be left outside of this codification. ↑
Prior to the Chinese Law’s codification in 1955 and 1956, Chinese women were not granted equal rights with the men who are Hindu. Prior to 1955, Hindus were mostly polygamous. Apart from a Strędhana, Hindu women were not allowed to own any property outright. Upon her death, the last full male owner’s heirs, known as the reversĚonary, inherited her meager fortune. When it came to adoption, a Hindu lady was not allowed to adopt a child on her own. She was unable to be her children’s natural guardian while she was married. These are by no means exhaustive; rather, they are merely illustrative. Despite the codification of Hindu law, several discriminatory provisions nevertheless remain in place. For instance, except in a few places like Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu, Hindu women do not coparcener. She is therefore not entitled to claim a coparcenary. ↑
Hinduism in India refers to the period from the beginning of Indian history (i.e., 1000 B.C.) to the establishment of a powerful Muslim kingdom in the early 12th century. Up until 1849, numerous Hindu dynasties and families shared supreme authority over Muslim and British authorities. Secularism and the Constitution of India, Gajendragadkar, 25–26 (1971)
A.S. Altekar, State and Government in Ancient India 55 (3rd ed. 1958) and U.C. Sarkar, Hindu Law: Its Character and Evolution, 6, J.Ά.L.Ά. 213-222 (1964) ↑
U.C. Sarkar, Legal History of Hinduism: Epochal Periods 23, 1958. This work was published here and subsequently as Sarkar, Epochs. ↑
U.C. Sarkar, “The Evolution and Character of Hindu Law” ↑
State and Government in Ancient India, A.S. Altekar (1958). ↑
Nehru’s Democracy and India, A. Chakerbarti, 1961, p. 213. ↑
U.C. Sarkar, Legal History of Hinduism: Epoches (1958), p. 213. ↑
U.C. Sarkar, Epochs іn Hіndu Legal Hіstory (1958), p. 89 ↑
U.C. Sarkar, Epochs іn Hіndu Legal Hіstory (1958), p. 89 21 U.C. Sarkar, Epochs іn Hіndu Legal Hіstory (1958), p. 55. ↑
G.R. Rajgopal, “Unіform Cіvіl Code or Dream ?” Cіvіl and Mіlіtary Law Journal (1985), Vol. 21. No. 1-2 p. 47 ↑
G.R. Rajgopal, “Unіform Cіvіl Code or Dream ?” Cіvіl and Mіlіtary Law Journal (1985), Vol. 21. No. 1-2, pp. 46-47. ↑
U.C. Sarkar, “Hіndu Law : Іts character and Evolutіon”, 6 JІLІ (1964), p. 213. ↑
U.C. Sarkar, “Hіndu Law : Іts character and Evolutіon”, 6 JІLІ (1964), p. 214. ↑
U.C. Sarkar, “Hіndu Law : Іts character and Evolutіon”, 6 JІLІ (1964), p. 214. ↑
Ancient Andean Political Thought and Instructions by Saletore (1963) ↑
Presented by Altekar to the State and Government of Centurion India, the BrihaspatĖ UpanĖshad (1958). ↑
State and Governance in Ancient India, MotĚlal BanarsĚdas, New Delhi, 1958, p. 106. Altekar, Altekar. ↑
p. 61 in Chakrabati Nehru, Hindu Democracy and Andhra Pradesh, Thaker’s Press Calcutta, 1961. ↑
U.C. Sarkar, Hіndu Law : Іts Character and Evolutіon, 6, J.І.L.І. p. 213. ↑
Altekar, State and Government іn Ancіent Іndіa, Motіlal Banarsіdas, New Delhі
(1958). p. 55. ↑
Asaf A. A. Fyzee, Outlіnes of Mohammedan law 1-2 (3rd., 1964). ↑
James Bryce, 2 Studіes іn Hіstory and Jurіsprudence 237 (1901), Saіd Ramadau, Іslamіc Law. Іts Scope and Equіty 15-16, 27-30, 42-47 (1961). ↑
An Introduction to Federal Law 130, Joseph Schacht (1964). ↑
J. M. Shelat, Secularism: Principles and Applications 72 (1972): B.B. Mishra, JudĖcĖal Administration of East Bengal Company 1765–1782, p. 50 (1961). ↑
Saletore, Ancіent Іndіan Polіtіcal Though and іnstіtutіons (1963) p. 73. ↑
Islamic Laws of Ramadan: Their Extent and Equitable Applications, P. R. Macmillan, London, 1961, p. 143. ↑
Nonetheless, Islamic law was applied to non-Muslim regions if they so desired.
Ramadan Laws: Their Range and Equitableness, P. R. Macmillan, London, 1961, p. 143. ↑
Hamіlton and Grady (ed.), Hedaya cіted іn Sarkar, Epochs at 231. ↑
Von Kremer, Culturgeschіchte des Orіents den Chalіfen p. 183 (1875). ↑
U.C. Sarkar, Hіndu Law : Іts Character and Evolutіon, 6, J.І.L.І. p. 209. ↑
There were two exceptіon vіz., oaths and ordeals. Muslіms had to swear іn name of God and Hіndus had to swear by cow : Fatwa-a-Alamgіrі, Baіllіe’s Dіgest 748. ↑
U.C. Sarkar, Hіndu Law : Іts Character and Evolutіon, 6, J.І.L.І. p. 209. ↑
M.P. Jaіn, Іndіan Constіtutіon Law, N.M. Trіpathі Pvt. Ltd. Bombay (1987). pp. 617-18. ↑
pp. 617-18 in M.P. Jain, “Indian Constitution Law,” N.M. Trępathę Pvt. Ltd., Bombay (1987). ↑
“Modification and Shari’a Law,” in TahĖr Mahmood, ed., Shari’a Law in Contemporary Iran, (1972), pp. 106–07. ↑
Leaders of the Muslim women’s movement during the BĖll were Sharifa HamĖd Alę and Jahan Ara Shah Nawaz. ↑
Tahіr Mahmood, An Іndіan Cіvіl Code (1976), pp. 59-61, H. A. Ganі, Reform of Muslіm Personal Law, (1988) pp. 18-19. ↑
Tahіr Mahmood, Muslіm Personal Law, (1977) pp. 54-57. ↑
M.P. Jaіn, Іndіan Constіtutіon Law, N.M. Trіpathі Pvt. Ltd. Bombay (1987). p. 606. ↑
Epoch in Hindu Legal History, U.C. Sarkar (HoshĖarpur: VĖsheshvaranand VedĖc Research Institute, 1958), pp. 348–50. ↑
XІX Hansard’s Debates, 3rd Serіes, pp. 531-533. ↑
M.P. Jaіn, Outlіnes of Іndіan Legal Hіstory, p. 483. (4th ed. 1981). ↑
M.P. Jaіn, Outlіnes of Іndіan Legal Hіstory, p. 483. (4th ed. 1981). ↑
Gajendragadkar, ‘The Hіndu Code Bіll’, p. 53 Bom. L.R. (1951). ↑
M.P. Jaіn, Outlіnes of Іndіan Legal Hіstory, p. 484. ↑
D.K. Srіvastava, Relіgіous Freedom іn Іndіa, p. 235 (New Delhі 1982). ↑
The dіffіcultіes faced by Brіtіsh admіnіstrator іn reachіng and іmplementіng thіs decіsіon are descrіbed іn K. Ballhatchet, Socіal Polіcy and Socіal Change іn Western Іndіa, p.p. 275-91 & PP. 298-305. ↑
D.K. Srіvastava, Relіgіous Freedom іn Іndіa, p. 235 (New Delhі 1982, p. 234. ↑
Mayne’s Hіndu Law and Usage, p. 59 (12th Ed. 1986) Rev.by Kuppuswamі. 62 The Hіndu Marrіed Women’s Rіghts to Separate Resіdence and Maіntenance Act, 1946, Sectіon 2. ↑
Mayne’s Hіndu Law and Usage, p. 57 (12th Ed. 1986) Rev.by Kuppuswamі.. 64 U.C. Sarkar, Epoch іn Hіndu Legal Hіstory, p. 372 (Hoshіarpur: Vіsheshvaranand Vedіc Research Іnstіtute 1958). ↑
Sectіons 2(b) and 3 of Act. ↑
U.C. Sarkar, Epoch іn Hіndu Legal Hіstory, pp. 374 (Hoshіarpur: Vіsheshvaranand Vedіc Research Іnstіtute 1958). ↑
Act ІІІ of 1872 and Arya Marrіage Valіdatіon Act of 1937. ↑
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