At the onset of the war, the United States isolated itself from active participation as it largely viewed the armed conflict as a European problem and did whatever it could not to intrude. The general expectation was that the conflict would be contained within Europe, but the scale of the war rapidly grew, affecting America in one way or another. Several factors narrowed down the political decision for America to go to war, and in the long run, it shortened the discourse on the war.
Even before Japan bombed Pearl Harbor, their relations with America were strained, especially with Japan’s aggression towards China. There had been diplomatic calls and sanctions imposed towards Japan, but when they forcefully took control of the American naval base at Pearl Harbor, America had no other option but to take matters into hand.
The sitting president of the United States in the period, Franklin Roosevelt, understood the security implications of the war even though the country had no direct involvement. His administration planned to play a silent role by collaborating with the European democratic states in culminating the aggression. Such was in the case where America’s forces offered safe passage to Britain’s weapons shipments across the Atlantic from German submarines. Such endeavours edged them towards war, and many countries, with Britain at the forefront, continuously offered incentives for America to participate, as spearheaded by Winston Churchill.
When Germans speculated a building alliance between their European enemies and America, they had to take preemptive measures to secure their stand. Germany launched an attack on America’s supply ships to the United Kingdom, which supplied them with the required resources to defend their territory during the aggression. The sinking of the American ships was a direct act of war, and America had enough reasons to defend its sovereignty during the war.
Works Cited
Blum, John Morton. V was for Victory: Politics and American Culture during World War II. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1976.
Wohlstetter, Roberta. Pearl Harbor: warning and decision. Stanford University Press, 1962.
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