The competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran is mainly, but not exclusively, geopolitical. The obvious sectarian dimension helps to burn the conflict. The local factors in each country also have a great influence. The competition offers specific risks that may increase during the next decade, in the US. UU And Europe. These risks include indirect effects (eg, migration and terrorism) due to increasing tensions and violent conflicts in the Middle East compounded by competition and renewed pressure to develop long-range nuclear weapons and missiles and increase volatility in the field. The world oil market The conflicts between Saudi Arabia and Iran, despite being historical and religious, have become a geopolitical rivalry. One of the participants in the seminar explained that the main sources of friction are rooted in the national, political, religious, economic and military interests of the countries.
Statement of Problem
Iran-Saudi conflict can lead serious security, political and economic problems for whole Middle East.
Current Nature of Conflict/Issue
The current rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran is likely to increase over the next five years, arguing that the bulk of the dispute is Iran’s support for conflict mediation groups in the Middle East (mainly in Iraq and Syria, presumably in Yemen and Bahrain). Iran indirectly fights Saudi Arabia in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain. Although supporting Saudi trust groups is not as strong as Iran’s support, it increases tensions between the two countries.
Iran and Saudi Arabia actively supported groups of forces fighting in Syria on both sides. This includes Iran’s support for Hezbollah and Saudi Arabia of a number of Salafist jihadist militias, officially or unofficially linked to Fatah al-Sham (previously the Nasra front), a pair of al-Qaeda. Iran sends members of the Revolutionary Guard to Syria, while Saudi Arabia sends arms and ammunition to insurgent groups. In Yemen, government forces in Saudi Arabia are waging a military campaign against Hootes, which took control of the country in early 2015. One participant noted that the Saudis believe that Iran directly supports the sadrists and that the Saudis regard the war in Yemen as a defense against the Iranian Shiite hegemony on its southern border.
Another participant identified Bahrain, where the Sunni monarch dominates the majority of the Shiite population, as a gray zone in the proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Saudi Arabia claims that Iran unleashed demonstrations there in 2011, at the insistence of the royal family of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia sent troops to fight protesters. The Saudis and the Iranians continue to argue about Bahrain and accuse some of them of interfering in the internal affairs of the country and exerting influence. As for the national indicators of the growth of unrest, Saudi Arabia seems to have toughened its position on the Shiite minority. January 2016 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia supplies the prominent Shia priest Sheikh Nimr El Nimr with 46 people who angered Iran and led to the termination of diplomatic relations between the countries. However, the new King of Saudi Arabia seems ready to suppress public unrest in his country. The recently outlined Concept 2030 describes a policy that must be protected from such demonstrations, creating more jobs and developing the private sector. But King Salman led his country through foreign policy to a full-fledged war in Yemen.
Main Stakeholder in the Conflict
Since 1979, the Islamic revolution in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iran has been the deciding factor in the Middle East and, more importantly, in the Persian Gulf as competitors to strengthen influence. Saudi Arabia and Iran describe their political direction as Islam. Although the differences between foreign policy are high, Saudi Arabia is a strong ally against the West, as opposed to the foreign policy of Iran, the greatest enemy of the West. Saudi Arabia is a regional power and is carrying out revolutionary changes in Iran, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East (Terrill, 2011). There is a decisive military alliance between Saudi Arabia’s strong oil income and the US and its religious status. Saudi Arabia follows the monarchy as its political system.
Iran is a political and ideological threat to Saudi Arabia, as it supports minorities in Saudi Arabia, the growth of the Iranian army and its capabilities, as well as Iran’s negative attitude toward American troops in the Persian Gulf countries (Alam, 2001). While Iran has other concerns about security threats, these threats are mainly related to the intervention of the United States in connection with the growing presence of US forces and bases in the GCC and the participation of extraterritorial forces in the security zone. (Alam, 2001). Iran has become an asymmetric ideological threat to Saudi Arabia after the Iranian revolution. The conflict between these two countries extends to its foreign policy with neighboring countries, such as Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria. The possession of nuclear weapons by Iran does not directly threaten Saudi Arabia, but it will encourage Iran to act more resolutely in these countries. In the Persian Gulf region, Saudi Arabia is a strategically important member, but if Iran has its own nuclear system, this will create a threat to Saudi Arabia’s superiority in the region.
Complaints regarding the inconsistency of current US policy in the Middle East frequently occur, such as complaints about passivity. The United States is trying to limit Iran’s influence in Syria, but it is negotiating with Iran over nuclear weapons. It is compatible with the Iranian trade union government in Iraq against the Sunni uprising that plays an important role, but opposition to the Iranian government in Syria and the Union supports the Sunni Islamist uprising that plays an important role. The appeal has led to the fall of the Assad regime, but it is far from the use of force against him, then he became an indirect partner of the agreement on the liberalization of chemical weapons in Syria. Talk about democracy in Egypt, but he refuses to call a military coup by his name. You can format this list more. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states believe that Washington is willing to recognize the Middle East as a zone of influence of Iran in order to achieve this goal.56 It is inconceivable that the United States, which are closely linked to this, is that Israel take a dominant role in Iran.
OIC and Iran-Saudi Conflict
The clash between two Iranian rivals and Saudi Arabia has hit many Middle Eastern countries and many regional and international Islamic organizations, such as the League of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Organization for Islamic Cooperation. (OIC). This document will focus on the impact of the Saudi-Iranian competition on the OIC.
At the beginning, the OIC seemed to want to resolve the clash between Saudi Arabia and Iran through diplomacy. Tariq al-Bahit, director of political affairs at the Organization of the Islamic Conference, was surprised by the optimism of nine days before the extraordinary meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and declared that the organization would be ready to play the role intermediary. He noted that the Organization of the Islamic Conference can not interfere in the internal affairs of the Member States or, on the one hand, towards the other. The OIC secretary general Iyad Madani was also ready to ask for a diplomatic solution and help restore the deterioration of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Iran and Saudi Arabia should play an active role in establishing relations with the countries of the region in order to find a solution to the difficult situation in their region torn by conflict. Confessional unity is only an effective threat, because it has been recognized and cultivated in these communities by external agents who cultivate only chaos and chaos. If these odious elements are not preserved, eventually their strength will disappear, leaving only peace and harmony in the region.