Introduction
The book Essence Of Decision: Explaining The Cuban Missile Crisis By Graham Allison And Philip Zelikow: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis” is written by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow. The book explains the possible reasons and authors’ explanation about the motives Russia and America had at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. The book provides various models to present what could have been the approach used by presidents to decide their next strategy in the 1962 crisis. At the time of this crisis, it was thought that this crisis could be the basis of the next world war that would be fought with nuclear weapons and would be destructive even ten times that of previous world wars. The book focuses on the decision-making process chosen by these countries as well the participation and involvement of other nations who helped in setting nuclear basis in their countries.
Summary
The book is composed of seven chapters in which authors slowly progress towards the end of the decision-making process and provide various approaches to realize the possible causes and effects of this crisis. The first chapter is focused on the Rational Actor Model. The model describes the Cuban missile crisis as the sole act of a unique actor. According to this model, the crisis that shook the world in 1962 was only a result of what rational decisions Presidents Kennedy and Krushev took. The second chapter explains the possible reasons for Russian missile deployment in Cuba. The chapter provides four possible reasons for this deployment that are; to wage war against America, to defend against American attack, to show nuclear dominance or just because of the influence of bureaucracy.
The third chapter provides another approach to the crisis called the “Organizational Model.” According to this model, the decisions taken by presidents are not always “free will”; instead, they are made by careful observation of the benefits of the organization. The fourth chapter is the relevant evidence of this model and how this model can be used to explain the organizational approach taken by presidents in this issue. The fifth and sixth chapters are focused on the government politics model. This model argues leaders make government policy by coming under the influence of bureaucracy. These actors stay hidden behind the safe walls of government, and their influence is reflected by the ones in power, i.e., the presidents. The decisions made by these bureaucrats are the result of their personal and organizational interests, and the final decisions coming out of the command are neither rational nor organizational but the approach used by bureaucrats.
The seventh chapter is the conclusion of all these chapters. It describes how all these approaches and models are related to each other and to what extent each of them was used in the decision-making process. It also describes an array of approaches to making American foreign policy and presents how these models complement each other. In this chapter, it was concluded that, to some extent, all of these models were experienced in the foreign policy-making process and analyzing just one of them will not fully explain the reasons behind the process. The policy analysis begins with the first model, its organizational structure is provided by the second, and finally, the third model discusses the participation of bureaucracy to conflict or superimpose with the policymaking process that eventually resulted in the decisions made by the presidents.
Research
The decision-making process is explained with three possible approaches. Each has its concerns and certain factors linked to them. After careful analysis of the pros and cons, the final decision of missile deployment made by the American government in Turkey was considered, and Kennedy took a bold step. While deciding on missile deployment, he had the option to discuss it with the bureaucracy, but there is certain evidence which supports this model in the decision-making process. The main point of this evidence is the immediate reaction Kennedy took after Khrushchev deployed missiles in Cuba to show military and nuclear dominance (Allyn et al., p.138). The immediate reaction Kennedy took rejected the hypothesis that he discussed it with others. Rather, he chose this option through self-analysis of the issue, and he decided on what he found feasible in his knowledge and wisdom.
The analysis of weapons withdrawal made by different researchers help us reach to the argument that both countries were not directly in favor of a clash, rather they both wanted to solve the issue peacefully. Allen and Blight’s argument on the issue is that America had no intention to wage war against Russia, but they were left with no option but to react to the issue by showing nuclear equivalence (Allyn et al., p.130). The evidence exists for Russian actions on the issue, too, given by Cimbala that Russia wanted to answer to America’s nuclear deployment of Turkey as a warning and to overcome the gap between the nuclear stability of both countries (Cimbala, p.199).
Whyte and Levi have answered the concept of organization in the decision-making process approach taken by Kennedy (Whyte, G., & Levi, A. S). It was claimed that the action Kennedy eventually took was the result of a combined analysis made by “organization” that refers to the decision-making group of America. This organization is claimed to be Ex-Com. It is also possible that politicians encouraged Kennedy to show strength and motivated him to deploy missiles in Turkey and block Cuban ports. Evidence of the organization approach is also present in decisions made by the Russian government. The argument given by Allyn in Russian nuclear deployment was the element of secrecy that was absent from Russian actions. The Soviet government openly deployed missiles in Cuba, which shows that this deployment was a strategic approach taken by the Soviet government. This argument is in favour of the organizational approach, too (Allyn, p. 153).
Many examples of the influence of bureaucracy are present in the history of wars, and multiple pieces of evidence in the present also claim that actions can be taken by a single person or a group. The countries make decisions against any action that is a threat to their existence and take measures to eliminate or suppress the threat. For this purpose, country leaders sometimes take actions on their own, and sometimes, a more critical approach and an analysis of pros and cons is required, in which case the policy-making organizations are included.
Very few countries have used an active strategy to answer against any potential threat, and only some of the countries that are too stable have shown the world that they are not some nations any country can challenge. In the present age, many countries have nuclear power and have solid nuclear plans ready to be used in case any war breaks. But there are some concerns that every country knows about “nuclear wars” that no matter who wins the war involving nuclear weapons, the result would be devastating for the whole world. In WWII, only two nuclear bombings in Japan made the country fall to their knees and forfeit the war (Feis, p. 210). It is an example that decisions involving nuclear weapons are not something to be taken immediately. Rather, countries use advanced methods to come to their decisions. These decisions, whether made by a single leader, or are a collective decision of organizations or a result of bureaucratic involvement, are always made with care to ensure the sustainability and survival of the country on the face of the earth.
Works Cited
Allyn, Bruce J., James G. Blight, and David A. Welch. “Essence of revision: Moscow, Havana, and the Cuban missile crisis.” International Security 14.3 (1989): 136-172.
Blight, James G., Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch. Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse. Rowman& Littlefield, 2002.
Busch, Andreas. “Graham T. Allison: Essence of decision. Explaining the Cuban missile crisis, Little, Brown and Company: Boston 1971, 338 S.” Klassiker der Sozialwissenschaften. Springer VS, Wiesbaden, 2016.281-284.
Cimbala, Stephen J. Military persuasion: Deterrence and provocation in crisis and war. Penn State Press, 2010.
Feis, Herbert. The atomic bomb and the end of World War II. Princeton University Press, 2015.
Graham, Allison, and Zelikow Philip. “Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban missile crisis.” Boston: Little, Brown, and Company (1971).
Whyte, Glen, and Ariel S. Levi. “The origins and function of the reference point in risky group decision making the case of the Cuban missile crisis.” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 7.4 (1994): 243-260
