US Counter-Terrorism Policy

Introduction

The US Counter-Terrorism Policy has been one of the most controversial and often extensively debated policies. Critical analysis of the policy reveals that it has certain drawbacks and loopholes that need to be addressed immediately and efficiently to make the policy more effective and efficient. Otherwise, several issues can surface, including national security, social integrity and increased terrorism incidents or allegations.

Problem with US Counter-Terrorism Policy

Not one or the other, the new 2011 US National Strategy for Counterterrorism, nor the as-of-late distributed counter-radicalization strategy, give a model whereupon Federal, State and neighbourhood law enforcement and regular person organizations could successfully arrange what’s to come Us defence against terrorism.

Rationale

Currently, America is facing multiple challenges and issues in the domain of counterterrorism. The National Strategy for Counter-terrorism, which was exhibited on 29 June 2011, endeavours to audit those tests in an extensive way. Upon the arrival of production, the US was energetically included in military operations, especially in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, etc. Secretive counter-terrorist operations run much further away from home.

The US military engagement in Afghanistan is currently the longest and costliest war. The resultant cost of America’s counter-terrorism deliberations as far as US losses and fiscal consumption throughout the most recent 1tenyears has been limitless. The planet’s political and budgetary scene has been all in all characterized by America’s counterterrorism exertion. As the 2012 US presidential decision approaches, numerous Americans are currently asking how the US can withdraw from these wars abroad in which it is locked in.

The new National Counterterrorism Strategy tries to address that issue. It offers much that is natural from past strategies about debasing al-Qaeda’s proficiency abroad and working with international accomplices to accomplish triumph. It even heads off so far as to prescribe al-Qaeda is well on the way to rout. Nonetheless, it then plots the counter-terrorist circumstance in nine separate theatres of operation over the planet. Those rundowns don’t prescribe that success or dominance against al-Qaeda, its associates, and its sympathizers is impending. Unfortunately, al-Qaeda-identified terrorism against America and its interests, and the West all in all, will remain a risk for the near future.

The second main consideration that requires point-by-point attention is the planet’s rate of technological change. This is happening at the speediest rate in history and is having a sensational effect on both international relations and the danger of terrorism. Whilst governments can now control data in the ballpark of a subject’s close-to-home foundation, their travel histories and their accounts, the rate of technical change, the sheer volume of data, protection concerns, the expenditure of national IT anticipates and inter-office turf wars all utmost a government’s adequacy when taking care of mass It data.

Contrast that and the force the Internet has now given a dissenter or terrorist. Interpersonal interaction by people has, as of late, expedited spontaneous upsets over the Middle East in the ‘Arab Spring’. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen if the foundation of new governments in the Middle East really decreases the risk of terrorism against European and Western countries. The National Counter-terrorism Strategy claims that the ‘Arab Spring’ is a sum vanquish for al-Qaeda. Sensibly, it is so unanticipated it is not possible to make such a clearing claim. Just time will tell. The singular frustration that started the ‘Arab Spring’ might, truth be told, advance into yet more terrorism pointed at the West. This is unavoidably set to happen if the new administrations backed by the US end up being preferable for their populaces over those that the prevalent uprisings supplanted.

In both nations, al-Qaeda will clearly remain alarmed to enlist an alternate era of frustrated Muslim adolescents to its ranks. The part of informal communication throughout the later revolts in the UK demonstrates how technological change can likewise be utilized by culprits and terrorists.

Conclusion

Critically evaluating the given conditions and loopholes of the US National Security and Counter Terrorism policy, it is evident that it has critical and severe inefficiencies and deficiencies that need to be considered immediately. Some of the most critical issues include its negligence over social, economic and technological perspectives of terrorism and social reforms.