

Terrorism Will Disappear Only When We Threaten To Boycott The Countries That Sponsor It

Posted on January 21, 2020

State Sponsorship, Terrorism, and Economic Boycotts

Terrorism is ruining the lives of people in the world, and the world's intelligence services believe that thousands of terrorists are waiting to attack. Terrorism will disappear only when we threaten to boycott the countries that sponsor it. Terrorists cannot exist without their sponsors. The lack of funding, resources, buyers and pure support isolates and paralyzes terrorists. They will no longer be able to wage terrorist wars and commit terrorist attacks in the Middle East, Hindustan, Africa and other cities in our countries. Over the past few weeks, "coincidences" and connections have been poured out of the cornucopia. Blink, and you miss them, so I recommend following the daily analysis of Sott.net. First, the terrorist attack on London Bridge, just two weeks after the bombing in Manchester and just a week before, perhaps the most important election in the UK in this generation (Zamani-Farahani & Henderson, 2010).

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt broke off diplomatic relations with Doha and stopped all communication with Qatar, accusing it of supporting terrorism and interfering in their internal affairs. Some other states joined the decision later. Kuwait acted as an intermediary in resolving the conflict. Later, the Arab countries presented an ultimatum to Qatar, urging him to agree to the requirements of the neighbors within ten days. The ultimatum contains 13 demands, including a reduction in the level of diplomatic and military relations with Iran, the closure of the Turkish military base, the termination of financing of terrorist organizations, the refusal to interfere in the internal affairs of Arab countries, the support of opposition figures, and the closure of the entire satellite television network Al-Jazeera ". It is not clear how serious this threat can be, but for many years in the Persian Gulf countries, more than once, There were coups diet at born in the bowels of royal families. Usually, the elder son rebelled against his father, or his brother rebelled against his brother; something similar happened in Saudi Arabia itself Last week; from Qatar's point of view, this is perhaps the greatest danger. If the coup fails, this crisis can last for a long time with completely unpredictable consequences for Qatar and the region as a whole. Although, in fact, this is not yet a complete "naval blockade," nevertheless, such a joint action made a small country not only politically isolated but also irreparably damaged the sea trade of Qatar. That is the export of oil and the import of food, equipment, and consumer goods.

In the last few months, we were fed a ridiculous farce that Qatar was “exposed” as a sponsor of jihadist terrorism by another of its crafty adherents, Saudi Arabia. It’s almost the same as if McDonald’s accused Burger King of selling unhealthy food, so obviously, there’s more to this “quarrel” than it seems at first glance (or more than the media report). The accusations from Saudi Arabia, which appeared only a couple of days after the terrorist attack of the jihadists on London Bridge, were apparently intended to convey the message: “Blame Qatar, not us!” Also topical for fans of jihadist terror is the long-awaited “delicate” report of the British government on the financing of terrorism by Saudi Arabia in the UK.

This report is, of course, even more “delicate” if we take into account the last elections in the UK, in which the conservative government (extremely close to Saudi thugs and very fond of selling a large number of weapons) hoped to find a “mandate” from the British people for an additional five years financed Saudi Arabia terrorism on British soil, not to mention Syria, Libya, Iran and other countries where the massacre of civilians is cleverly used for geopolitical purposes. Another possible reason for Saudi Arabia’s humiliation with Qatar is the fact that the Qatari (the world’s largest exporter of liquefied natural gas) were in too close a relationship with other countries (Baskan & Wright, 2011).

Energy Interests in Iran and Qatar

Both Iran and Qatar own a huge gas and oil field on the North / South Parsa in the Persian Gulf (certainly the largest in the world). At the bottom of the bay, there are still huge quantities of oil and gas. While the Qataris have been exporting since the mid-1990s, the Iranians, to expand production in their sector, entered into a deal with the French energy company Total only last year (along with the Chinese CNPC and the Iranian Petropars).

Interestingly, Total (along with several other Western energy corporations) also participates in the gas business with Qatar. The problem, however, is the general nature of this deposit. While both countries have maritime boundaries that define their “possessions,” the gas field does not know these boundaries, and the amount of gas produced by any country depends only on how much it can extract (gas, as a rule, flows into hollow areas).

Sanctions, Regional Alliances, and the Isolation of Iran

After the lifting of sanctions on Iran in 2015, Iranians are steadily catching up with Qatar for gas production. The conclusion of the deal between Qatar and Iran on the use of their common field makes sense from economics and logistics, and this seems to be something they have been quietly engaged with in recent months. The situation is aggravated by the fact that last year, Qatar bought a 19.5% stake in giant Rosneft for \$ 10.2 billion, which was the first such deal in other countries with the participation of foreign interests (Bader & Schuster, 2015).

All this again raises the question of a possible resurrection of the Qatar-Turkey pipeline, which was supposed to direct Qatar's gas through Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria to Turkey and Europe. When the original pipeline plan was rejected by Assad to "protect the interests of Syria was drawn into a "civil war" (which had been planned for a long time), fueled by Qatar and jihadist mercenaries backed by Saudi Arabia, the Direct assistance of Western governments. However, last year, the chimerical members of the Qatari royal family seem to have finally reconciled to the fact that Assad will remain in power and the Middle East. Therefore, what recently scared the Saudis and their Western allies is not just a possible alliance between Iran, Syria, and the Middle East but an alliance involving Qatar and its huge gas reserves (Patrick Cockburn, 2017).

Now it becomes clear why Trump, during his visit to Saudi Arabia, called on "all countries with a conscience to isolate Iran," and Saudi Arabia recently took a step in this direction by sending threats to Qatar. Now we can also understand why jihadists (no doubt sponsored by the Saudis) killed 12 people during the terrorist attack in Tehran and why Iran immediately accused Saudi Arabia of this. And at the end of this farce, when the Qataris responded to the charges of the Saudis in the "financing of terrorism," saying that the Qatari news channel was attacked by hackers, as a result of which there was a fictitious story about the ties of the Qatari royal family with Iran, the temptation to take advantage of the situation was too Great for the "deep state" of the US: through their official channel of propaganda – CNN – they allowed "unnamed sources" to reveal involvement in "hacker attacks" on Qatar (Patrick Cockburn, 2017).

Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Competing Terrorism Accusations

Crises of this kind in the Middle East, we add, had happened before, although these heated passions did not reach the point. It's hard to imagine that Qatar's generosity to terrorists of all colors and shades did not know or did not know much about Saudi Arabia. More than three years ago, in the spring of 2014, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE also jointly recalled their ambassadors from Doha. The cause of the crisis was a scandalous statement by Qatar about the support of Mohammed Mursi (the Egyptian president, an elected candidate from the Muslim Brotherhood).

True, the scandal quickly hushed up, and the diplomats came back to Qatar. The neighbors did not block the air and sea communication. The mention of terrorists was hardly the main reason for the decision of the Four, who took up arms against Qatar. Another thing is Iran and, in general, the very flexible policy of Qatar, which the "hackers" declared. Some media outlets are already writing about the upcoming state coup in Doha. Saudi Arabia is not ready to compromise and, therefore, chose Qatar as its main target. This target was allegedly shown at the Islamic-American summit in Riyadh as part of the "campaign to eradicate terror." Concerning the Saudi press, the resource reports on the preparation of a coup in Qatar in favor of the "legitimate wing of the ruling family." Anyway, powerful external pressure already affects the policy of Qatar (Zamani-Farahani & Henderson, 2010).

In connection with Qatar's collective accusation of supporting entire terrorist networks, we should add that we should expect Saudi Arabia and its closest neighbors and allies to actively fight against IG, Al-Qaeda, and other factions warmed up in Doha. And at the same time struggle with Doha itself.

Terrorism and the Geopolitics of Natural Resources

Terrorism is used as a cover for the war for control over the natural resources of the Middle East and, consequently, for "world control. The Anglo-American establishment has long linked its destiny with Saudi thugs, who own the world's largest oil reserves and production facilities for its processing. The firepower of the United States, coupled with Saudi oil, allowed the West to rule the ball for many decades (Patrick Cockburn, 2017). This era, however, is rapidly approaching its end. Unfortunately, there is little hope that the "exceptional" Anglo-American establishment and their ideological brother thugs will adequately surrender their positions. No matter how it is! Their approach resembles the methods of a typical tyrant, possessed by a thirst for power. Its portrait has been well described in the literature for many centuries: a man who, facing the imminent decline of his power, comes to the idea that "if I cannot have it, then no one will get it as it is still characteristic of them.

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