Any person who has come into contact with the law is completely aware of the common police phrase, which states that everyone has the right to remain silent during interrogation. This phrase and others include access to a lawyer and are widely known as Miranda rights (Graham, 1966, p. 59). The 5th Amendment protects the suspect from incriminating himself. In this case from 1960, Ernesto Miranda was arrested under convictions for bank robbery, rape, and kidnapping. He was thoroughly interrogated and he gave in to having committed the crimes. The petitioner goes ahead and suppresses his confession to the police about the investigation because the police had not issued him the Miranda warning. Consequently, the court overturned his conviction because he had not been adequately informed by the police who arrested him on his rights.
In this case, the Supreme Court respected his legal right to remain silent, which was not observed when he was in police custody. The court ruled out that all suspected had the right to be informed of their right to remain silent while in custody. Also, they should not be pressured or forced to admit the charges placed against them and if not, the statements made at that time can never be presented against the defendant in the court of law (Schrock et al. 1978, p. 1). Two years after the ruling of Miranda, Congress approved a bill declaring that confessions provided by suspects could be presented in the courts during the trial provided that the confessions were made. This meant that if the arrested personnel confessed at their own free will and gave in to the charges after being subjected to interrogation even if the police did not observe the Miranda right. According to many people, this new law made a contract with the Miranda ruling and was therefore termed as non-applicable.
Although Miranda had taken an oath and confessed to his criminal deeds such as raping an 18-year-old girl and bank robbery, his right to access a lawyer was not made known to him before he confessed. He was also not informed that his oral confessions would be used as evidence against him in a court of law. Aided by his lawyer, Dickerson appealed that his stated facts were false and involuntary. The court agreed with Congress, holding that the protections set forth for Miranda were not constitutionally specified. This meant that Congress had the right to overrule Miranda with a statute. However, the Supreme Court rule for Dickerson wrote that Miranda’s decision was valid as per the court and may not impact the Congress act which has overruled it. The court decided that the warning should be incorporated into police routines. The two justices argued that there was nothing unconstitutional about using voluntary statements by defendants against them. In the Miranda v. Arizona case, the Supreme Court decision had attended various instances involving interrogating suspects in police custody. In these distinctive cases, suspects were interrogated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the defendant was not issued clear information concerning his rights before the commencement of the investigation procedure. Altogether, starred cases confessions and signed statements were admitted during the trial of the specific suspects.
The Supreme Court ruled that due to the absence of appropriate precautions, the interrogation procedure of suspected or accused individuals of certain crimes in custody involves captivating tensions designed to reduce the suspect’s ability to contest. A while after the court resolved the conviction of Miranda, he was tried again by the state of Arizona, but his confession was not introduced as proof. The resolution by the court was that, due to the coercive nature of the custodial interrogation, the written statements and disclosures were invalid. Therefore, they were not considered because no self-incrimination phrases or confessions were allowed. The 5th and the 6th Amendment rights granted that the suspect was unaware of his rights or chose to ignore them (Grisso, 1980, p. 1134).
The Miranda rights hold that arrested personnel at any time during questioning should know they can choose not to say a word to anyone about their crimes. If the person asks for a lawyer, the request should be met in relation to the legal requirements, and the questioning must stop until the lawyer is present. At that time, the suspect can confer with the lawyer and have him present during any interrogation and recording of statements. However, the justices accused the majority rulers of wrongly facing the coercive interrogation issue. They asserted that once the suspects were warned of their rights, they would always demand the presence of an attorney to deny the investigation bureau access to confessions.
According to the case, Miranda tried again in 1967 after the court overthrew his original case. The prosecutor opted for witnesses this time and other evidence apart from his confessions (Bates, 2017). The witnesses testified about his crimes, and the court found him guilty where he was put behind bars for 20-30 years. Miranda was bailed in 1972, and he returned to his home where he wrote autography on Miranda and how arrested suspects should be granted their Miranda rights in every circumstance. Other suspects were also arrested but opted to remain silent unlike Miranda, and hence they were released due to lack of evidence. Other defendants whose cases were tied alongside Miranda pleaded for less charge but were proven guilty without including their confessions and previous incriminating statements which the Supreme Court had barred before.
Miranda’s suspect rights should be implemented and embedded in society. This is to prevent the suspects from giving false statements at the time of arrest because this may be influenced by fear or pressure from the police at the time of arrest or in police custody.
References
Bates, K. A. (2017). Miranda v. Arizona. The Encyclopedia of Juvenile Delinquency and Justice.
Graham Jr, K. W. (1966). What is Custodial Interrogation: California’s Anticipatory Application of Miranda v. Arizona. UCLA L. Rev., 14, 59.
Grisso, T. (1980). Juveniles’ capacities to waive Miranda rights: An empirical analysis. Cal. L. Rev., 68, 1134.
Schrock, T. S., Welsh, R. C., & Collins, R. (1978). Interrogational Rights: Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona. S. Cal. L. Rev., 52, 1.
