

Counter Terrorism Policy Of The United States

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Introduction

The United States has faced multiple challenges in recent times that have impacted its capabilities to develop a strong, coherent and homogenized society. The law enforcement agencies, in collaboration with the Federal Government, have been working immensely to develop strategies, policies, and regulations to counter these challenges. The most devastating, highly concerning, and critical challenge faced by the United States is that of the development of policies regarding the control of organized crime and terrorism. There have been significant debates regarding which domain should the authorities focus more. Should they focus more on countering the organized crime or the terrorist activities? Critically observing and analyzing the impact and the underground intentions of both organized activities and terrorist activities, it can be stated that it is important for law enforcement agencies to invest more energy and resources in countering terrorism.

There are multiple reasons for making this claim. Terrorist activities have a greater impact on the overall society as well as national integrity (Manwaring, 2014). Furthermore, the terrorist outfits and organizations tend to support and establish organized crime agencies as well to get regional support and stability. Therefore, if the terrorist organizations are controlled and curbed, they can be back tracked to the agencies of local organized crime as well (Reese, 2012). This will further enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement agencies and regulations. The respective paper will precisely discuss how the terrorist activities tend to become more devastating for the overall national integrity and security.

Introduction Of Policy Problem/Area

The concern is being raised that despite having a well-composed counter-terrorism policy, the incidents of terrorism have increased in the USA. This does not necessarily involve bomb blasts by foreign terrorists. Instead, the incidents of shootings by American youth have increased tremendously. Furthermore, the incidents of domestic and regional violence and terrorism are also increasing in countries like Pakistan and Iraq as a reaction to American drone attacks and American intrusion. Regardless of the intention of the USA, the credibility of Counterterrorism policies is being questioned here.

The paper will further discuss the problems with the [Counter Terrorism](#) policy of the USA and its implications on the international world as well as the United States. The paper will claim that it is the

weakness of respective policy that is leading to regional as well as international incidents of terrorism, including shooting incidents in the USA and bomb blasts as a result of drone attacks.

Background

American counter-terrorism endeavors have been condemned for focusing on military implies rather than utilizing all the instruments of national force, tact, information, military and budgetary force the purported Dime. Tragically, it shows up in the wake of using trillions of dollars on wars, country security, and other guard identified things, the United States neglects to comprehend its foes and neglects to comprehend numerous lessons from history. As some counter-terrorism specialists have noted, "the U.S. governing elite's failure to change any significant part of its Cold War-era view of the world and how it works also has contributed greatly to America's so-far-losing performance against the Islamists." (Scheuer, 2009)

From various perspectives, this portrayed the administration of George W. Bush, the thought that terrorist gatherings couldn't be deterred, and the main choice was to murder all the terrorists. The thought was that terrorism might be vanquished by murdering all the terrorists. Unfortunately, the cutting-edge clash is not this basic, "strategic success in contemporary conflict is based on the sophisticated political-psychological application of all instruments of national and international power. In short, this kind of war relies mostly on words, images, ideas, and soft power and a certain disregard for convention." (Manwaring, 2014)

Others believe that the situation is more complex than ever imagined and perceived as "the war against the ideology that drives al-Qaeda and similar radical Islamist jihadi groups are of necessity a long and many-sided one. The search for quick fixes, for easy methods, for compromise and appeasement serves only to strengthen the extremists." (Martin & Celso, n.d.)

What Is Terrorism?

In the respective context, terrorism can be defined as "the illegitimate use or threat of violence to further political objectives. It is illegitimate in that it targets civilians and non-combatants, and it is perpetrated by clandestine agents of state and non-state actors in contravention of the laws of war and criminal statutes." (Cunningham, 2003). Not long after the ambushes of September 11, 2001, the United States proclaimed "war on terrorism," this has advanced into "The Global War on Terrorism." Unfortunately, terrorism is truly a military and political strategy utilized by those with constrained military assets to strike much stronger military adversaries. The United States has never proclaimed war on a plan in its history until after September 11, 2001. The United States did not announce war on massed tank arrangements or join arms warfare at any point in its history.

American concern of terrorism is truly a concern over transnational, territorial, and nearby terrorist associations and their capability to ambush the United States country and also United States interests

abroad. Today, this risk is essentially inferred from Al Qaeda and other associated terrorist gathers. As the United States Strategy for Counterterrorism has explained, “the preeminent security threat to the United States continues to be from al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents.” (Reese, 2012)

The anthropologist expert Dr. David Kilcullen has noted the Global War on Terror is actually all the more suitably portrayed as a global jihadist rebellion, “which – like other insurgent movements – uses terrorism, subversion, propaganda and open warfare.” (Kilculin, 2005) Others describe it as “a counterinsurgency framework that bestows legitimacy upon al-Qaeda and its affiliates. An insurgency is a time-honored form of warfare, engaged in by legitimate warriors and akin to centuries of struggles for self-determination. Terrorism, on the other hand—i.e., the deliberate targeting of civilians by nonstate actors for symbolic political effects—is never legitimate.” (Cronin, 2012)

Another example further incorporates ramble strikes by the United States. Killing a few terrorists is absolutely a great strategy, yet strategically, if a populace becomes fanatic or blameless civilians are killed, this could produce a huge kickback. Additionally, one sort of plan may be viable against a specific sort of terrorist aggregation, while the same strategy may not work against an alternate kind of terrorist gathering. Other issues with counterterrorism viability continue, “[t]here has been a proliferation of anti-terrorism programs and policies as well as massive increases in expenditures toward combating terrorism. We currently know almost nothing about the effectiveness of any of these programs.” (Lum, Kennedy & Sherley, 2006)

Furthermore, others explain that “while effectiveness could be regarded as one of the most, if not the most important aspect of counterterrorism policy, not just academically but also politically, its study is plagued by both theoretical underdevelopment and a lack of methodological grounding.” (Cronin, 2012)

Therefore, major causes of loopholes and drawbacks in the policy occur, “because major attacks are rare, there is little evidence to go on to find the best way to counter terrorism or to establish whether certain measures are useful in preventing terrorism. The absence of a major terrorist attack is no useful indicator of the success of counterterrorism; as a result, the effectiveness of countermeasures against terrorism cannot easily be established.” (Lum, Kennedy & Sherley, 2006)

Before And After 9/11 Attacks

Before the brutal attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States had constrained exposure and experience with terrorist strikes on American grounds and just intermittent experience with assaults abroad. Throughout the 1970s and 80s, air transport hijackings and abroad bombings were the centers of the most terrorist action. In the year 1993, brutal Islamist radicals bombarded the World Trade Center, with the loss of innocent lives and damages of thousands of dollars, however coming up short altogether harm the structures themselves. Throughout the following decade, numerous domestic-centered Islamist terrorist plots were thwarted at the arranging stage.

The brutal attack of September 11, 2001, and the resulting review examinations, for example, the 9/11 Commission Report – uncovered the insufficiency of this structural engineering in tending to and upsetting further assaults. The failure to coordinate information gathering and integration around different organizations expedited the disappointment in distinguishing examples of conduct that may have given cautioning of ambush. Controls intended to legislate electronic reconnaissance in the times of settled area line communications were troublesome to apply to communications media, for example, versatile, disposable phones or voice-over internet communications. What's more, indeed, when terrorists were recognized and caught, challenges in furnishing confirmation acceptable in universal court incidents left powers with not many parkways to keep or cripple them.

The central lesson was that a counterterrorism building design that is established on criminal equity standards is essentially situated to disciplining the individuals who have plotted or completed ambushes. At the same time, with the threat to a guiltless life posed by contemporary forms of terrorism, anticipation and not discipline become the basic drivers for counterterrorism. Furthermore, that presupposed refashioning our legitimate strategic approach (Manwaring, 2014).

This redefinition of contemporary terrorism concentrates on three components of the counterterrorism handle: intelligence accumulation, information integration, and terrorist control (Manwaring, 2014). The main alludes to how we can better gather information progressively inside the connection of current global communication, travel, and funding. Second factors concentrate on how we can better combine and integrate that information once gathered. The third factor emphasized how we can follow up on that information to debilitate terrorists at the soonest stage before they can develop their operations.

However, After the 9/11 incident, the National Security Agency was shocked and stunned. What's more, it was constrained to acquire a few basic and quite delicate changes in their triple center points, as stated beneath (Manwaring, 2014).

Moreover, The USA Patriot Act updated electronic perception controls to allow warrants to intercept individuals in reality when they chronically changed phones and to yield access to Internet correspondences on the same essential terms as applicable to standard telephone interchanges (Manwaring, 2014).

Possibly the most well-known result and conclusion of the 9/11 Commission was the alerted signs that surfaced from independent intelligence things. This disappointment arose out of institutional and social deterrents inside the intelligence organs, also from a real approach to the relationship between law prerequisite and intelligence gathering that amassed an impressive obstacle to information bestowing. The Patriot Act changed the law to inconceivably cut down the real deterrent to the offering, and to make a supposition of giving instead of restraint against advertising. Out of the blue, a later court decision by the FISA Court of Review made that the past interpretation of the FISA Court of Review bestowing was unduly stringent and reflected a too cautious approach to the lawful need.

The most questionable parts of the new honest-to-goodness development displaying for

counterterrorism arise out of the request of how to incapacitate some person secured here or abroad as a terrorist.

In the initial years after the 9/11 incident, Congress started no development to address the issue of debilitating, as it had done with the issues of intelligence gathering and giving through the Patriot Act (Reese, 2012). Moreover, the analysis of restriction and training propelled inside the Executive Branch. Close by the standard criminal value-building outline, the Bush Administration secured a military requisition structure, drawing upon the chronicled model of military requisitions that were impaneled all around the Civil War and the Second World War and its result. Military requisitions – material just to non-American subjects – were intended to apportion our order for the laws of war in the same way that the general individual value structure had restrained terrorists from misapplying resident laws (Reese, 2012).

Brief Analysis Of Some Successful Security Measures By The US

In Iraq, the United States had great exertions at enhancing security in Iraq, by utilizing a combination of instruments of force incorporating financial power by paying guerillas not to battle, discretionary power by enabling neighborhood authorities, and military force killing Al Qaeda in Iraq parts and by turning civilian populaces against Al Qaeda (Reese, 2012). This sample shows that “while politics and policing may be more effective in most cases, military force can be critical when facing a terrorist group involved in an insurgency. Such groups are often well equipped, well organized, and well-motivated, and police were acting alone would be quickly overpowered.” (Van & Pisiu, 2011) One of the strategies utilized in Iraq was a strategy of de-legalization of Iraq. Neighborhood sheiks and different religious and social pioneers started to stand up about Al Qaeda and its strike on different Muslims. Recent records seized from Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, show he and other Al Qaeda pioneers were extremely concerned with the brand, picture, and genuineness of Al Qaeda (Reese, 2012). Other stories have been created in the media demonstrating how Al Qaeda is using more than 50% off now is the right time to create films and compositions about its particular genuineness.

This strategy has been viable in facing religious terrorism because “when Islamist organizations lose religious justification, their activities resemble thuggery, their objectives become suspect, and their support is eliminated.” (Brzoska, 2011) In Iraq Al Qaeda and its member’s misfortune uphold by striking and killing pure civilians, this slip created a dispute between Al Qaeda and its associates, neighborhood tribes, and religious guides, Americans exploited the qualifications. Therefore, the strategy of disaggregation or exploiting the qualifications between Al Qaeda and nearby assemblies may be a successful strategy (Lum, Kennedy & Sherley, 2006).

Past examinations of how terrorist gathers closures show that most aggregations end in two different implies that “members decide to adopt nonviolent tactics and join the political process (43 percent),

or local law-enforcement agencies arrest or kill key members of the group (40 percent).” (Jones & Libicki, 2008) Minimal recorded confirmation exists for expansive scale global developments, most terrorist assemblies were limited or more provincial. Effective counter-terrorist measures appear to be best when joining political exertions and to police.

Previous verifiable data concerning terrorist assemblies may be of restricted use as Al Qaeda seems, by all accounts, to be a notable sort of terrorist assembly, unrealistic to participate in any political transactions. However, its provincial associates may be an alternate case. Overall, terrorism could be a successful apparatus, basically in little strategic triumphs, in spite of the fact that as a strategy for long-term triumph, terrorism normally falls flat.

Recommending Strategies For Improving Counter-Terrorism Policies

A disregarded idea of counter-terrorism has been deterrence. Stephen Flynn, the exceptional country security master, has what has all the earmarks of being a counterintuitive contention that the best safeguard for battling terrorism may not be a great offense but an exceptional resistance (Wilner, 2011). As such, terrorist bunches have exceptionally constrained assets; they regularly try to utilize assets in a way that augments the viability of their assaults. For instance, throughout the London transport and tram bombings in July of 2005, terrorists assumed the whole London transportation framework might be closed down for a lot of time. It was not, it re-opened rapidly, and Londoners demonstrated grit by riding both the metro and transport (Wilner, 2011). Terrorism, while dangerous, is minuscule when contrasted with the movements that kill most individuals, incorporating malignancy, coronary illness, or activity collisions.

However, with such a great amount of keeping tabs on Al Qaeda and its partnered gatherings in media outlets and scholarly grants, it shows up notwithstanding terrorism, and its little sway has been strategically adequate, in the expressions of Marxist logician Georgi Plekhanov, to draw in the consideration of the whole planet, is that not in itself a triumph? (Wilner, 2011) Of the size, extension, and risk of a small measure of terrorists, they accept an unequal measure of media consideration and unmanageable reactions using the obtuse instrument of the United States military, consequently assisting their causes and office (Wilner, 2011).

George F. Kennan, the acclaimed Cold War negotiator, was the father of America’s assorted regulation strategy to battle the Soviet Union, contended for a differing strategy utilizing all the components of national power to hold the Soviet Union, the United States requires a comparative strategy to battle terrorist aggregates (Manwaring, 2014). As shown by ambushes over the planet, Al Qaeda and other radical gatherings are not solid; this is a key discovery to be utilized as a central part of a strategy to counter the ascent of radical aggregations.

Dr. David Kilcullen has explained that “there is a global jihadist movement, but it comprises a loosely

aligned confederation of independent networks and movements, not a single unified organization. Global players link and exploit local players through regional affiliates – they rarely interact directly with local players, but sponsor and support them through intermediaries” (Wilner, 2011).

While history does give distinctive instances of victories and disappointments concerning counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations on basically a domestic level, there is research on directing operations at a global level. American strategy must be concentrated on a decentralized and neighborhood reaction to terrorist assembles. As David Kilcullen has noted, the greater the size and extent of the American power, the more probable the operation will bring about disappointment (Wilner, 2011). In this sense, terrorism is a security issue, as well as it is a governance issue.

Other Possible Alternatives/Solutions

Based on the implications and impacts of the weakened Counterterrorism policies of America, the following are some of the alternatives that can be deployed:

1. Restructure the Policy by asking mutual consent of stakeholder countries;
2. Involve the UN as a mediator to evaluate, audit and analyze the weakness of the policy;
3. Restructure the approach and make it milder rather than politically and strategically rigid.

Proposed / Recommended Strategy

Taking into account the ups and downs of strategies and policies as laid out in this paper, the best counterterrorism strategy might be one of a foundation of deterrence with extra research to comprehend the political, social, religious, and monetary sparks of terrorist gatherings (Van Um & Pisoiu, 2011). Subsequently, the United States may as well proceed to try endeavors to kill terrorists, as well as to catch them to interview and comprehend them; the United States’ capability to prevent terrorism could be enhanced by a more complex comprehension of our terrorist foes. Given the innate nature of numerous catch attacks, numerous terrorists won’t be caught; these assaults likewise present inborn dangers to burrowing little creature terrorist military and police constraints (Van Um & Pisoiu, 2011).

The second mainstay of a successful American counter-terrorism strategy might be to keep tabs on counter-terrorist exertions at the most reduced level. For instance, little scale American extraordinary constraints as consultants or coaches, Local military compels as often as possible have more realness to work than the United States has, and they have an improved comprehension of the earth, regardless of the fact that they have to improve the ability to manage extremist aggregates as time goes on this means a light U.S. military footprint or none whatsoever (Van Um & Pisoiu, 2011).

While accomplice organizations are regularly soiled in human rights ill-uses, it might be astute that better the Arabs do it passably than you do it flawlessly (Van Um & Pisoiu, 2011). While T.E. Lawrence

was talking about Arab attempts to battle throughout the war, the saying is staggeringly impactful and accurate for counter-terrorism work. When America sends extensive-scale military powers, it proceeds to bolster the story, personality, and social markers created by terrorist aggregates. Specifically, the thought that America has supreme aspirations and is pursuing a war on Islam.

The third aspect might be an adequate information battle (Van Um & Pisiu, 2011). The United States military and remote policy foundation have made a poor showing in demonstrating inspiration and movements. Terrorist gathers utilize terrorist attacks as information warfare; to most American, strengths, information, and open undertakings are a bit of hindsight. Terrorist attacks are regularly outlined and intended for the Polaroids. Terrorist attacks are for a crowd of people, or else they have no importance. However, Al Qaeda's grandest shortcoming is its capacity to make recoil and to demolish open uphold by its attacks on civilian targets.

Therefore, the United States may as well accentuate to a greater degree a strategy of delegitimization and winning the psychological perceptions: "Counterterrorism is just as much about hearts and minds as it is about policing and intelligence. It requires taking calculated actions that do not alienate Muslims. And it also requires effectively countering the ideology and messages of terrorist groups." (Jones & Libicki, 2008)

American endeavors ought to be focused on nearby rebellions and aggregations with a select attach to components that have the capacity to direct global operations (Reese, 2012). Not all Islamic uprisings focus on the United States; a few rebellions and terrorist aggregations focus on nearby issues and don't represent a danger to the American country or American interests abroad. Not all religious fanatics are a risk to American interests. Therefore, the strategy of disaggregation ought to be utilized.

This strategy highlights contrasts between Al Qaeda, its partners, and accomplices. As later grants have demonstrated, regardless of the possibility that major asylums advance in South Yemen and North Mali, Al Qaeda offshoots will encounter internal and outer resistance that in the past has debilitated radical Islamist amasses (Reese, 2012). Their resort to great brutality and ideological intransigence perpetually makes neighborhood adversaries and outside weight.

The final aspect of an adequate American counter-terrorism strategy is restraint.

A prominent terrorist plan is to start operations that incite an overcompensation by their enemies. While a few radicals will never set out their arms, military compel regularly causes an eruption. This is exemplified by Osama Bin Ladin's statement about Al Qaeda's strategy: all we need to do is to send two mujahidin to the uttermost point East to raise a fabric on which is composed al Qaeda, keeping in mind the end goal to make the officers race there to reason America to endure human, financial and political misfortunes without realizing for it anything of note (Reese, 2012). The thought of getting extreme on terrorists sounds simple in a fast sound chomp to the American individuals, yet eruption is a strategy our adversaries count on us to utilize since it checks the account of America as a supreme force who looks to the gap and vanquishes.

Conclusion

Creating a strategy to battle Al Qaeda and other partnered gatherings is not simple. Many strategies and strategies with complex variables might be utilized. History shows that numerous adequate strategies for countering terrorism are not military, however, join together policing activities, intelligence assembling, information warfare, and de-legitimization, there is no single immaculate counterterrorism strategy, and the best strategies incorporate various components (Manwaring, 2014).

However, truly, there have not been terrorist associations or developments with a global degree. Anarchist assemblies were well known throughout the early twentieth century, and Marxist liberal aggregations were prevalent throughout the 1960s through the 1990s (Reese, 2012). However, these gatherings did not speak to a substantial scale of global development. For eras, terrorists have directed attacks in the name of both common and religious causes. Terrorism as a strategy can't be crushed; it has been utilized by an incalculable number of performing artists all around history, from Jewish Zealots to Palestinian assemblies, for example, Hamas. Terrorism as a plan will never go away.

This does not mean terrorist aggregates can't be crushed. History shows that the motivation for a terrorist wave might dry out in time and that safety can devastate associations or make them incapable. But sadly, it additionally demonstrates that terrorists customarily imagine better approaches to direct their exercises (Lum, Kennedy & Sherley, 2006). In the instance of Al Qaeda and its partnered assemblies, it has zero risks of making a global Islamic caliphate; on the other hand, there are adequate chances for Al Qaeda and other comparative gatherings to homicide huge measures of individuals while changing and molding American and Middle Eastern policy by the utilization of viciousness. Al Qaeda and other partnered gatherings still have the capacity to attain transient objectives, for example, building places of refuge, attaining more volunteers, and changing American or European policy.

A multi-prong methodology utilizing all the components of force, with, to a lesser extent, keeping tabs on the military methods, might be a more viable instrument for countering terrorist aggregates. History has taught us that lesson (Lum, Kennedy & Sherley, 2006). It shows right away that President Obama's differing approach is attempting to rout terrorist gathers.

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